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JOB AND GOD

RALPH MARCUS

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WHETHER THE PROBLEMS which nature sets before the natural scientists are more complex than those which literary texts set before the philologist (using the name in the broad sense of linguist-historian-critic) is in itself a problem with which we are fortunately not concerned here. But, whatever the relative degrees of complexity in the two broad fields, there is no doubt that the problems that face the philologist in interpreting an ancient literary text are more troublesome, in at least two respects, namely, in that he is never sure whether he has seen all the problems or whether he has solved any of them.

If, however, for convenience and simplicity—two virtues not sufficiently appreciated by literary critics—we assume that the philologist has certain primary responsibilities, we seem to get along best by reducing their number to three: (1) understanding an author's language literally and figuratively; (2) understanding the background of his work, the landscape of his ideas and attitudes; (3) understanding the form of the work and the intention of the author.

I

The first of these conveniently assumed responsibilities becomes an unusually formidable one in the case of *Job*. Like all poetry, biblical Hebrew poetry is more obscure than prose. Furthermore, the obscurities of the poetic style of *Job* are multiplied by the following factors: the Hebrew vocabulary and idiom are strongly colored by borrowings from Aramaic and Arabic which leave the limits of meaning in doubt in the case of certain not too familiar Hebrew words; the manuscript tradition is often uncertain; there are obvious signs of theological tampering with the original text.

In addition to these special problems of interpreting the Hebrew text of *Job*, the philologist is faced by the general problems of translation. Every translation, as I have ventured to remark before,[1] is a compromise between two civilizations. A meaning can be carried over

1. "Jewish and Greek Elements in the Septuagint," *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume* (New York, 1945), pp. 227-46.

from one language to another only in the degree that the two communities of speakers share experiences. To take a homely example, every speaker of English with a little knowledge of French knows that *savoir faire* has the same general meaning as American English *know how*. But the similarity in general meaning is counteracted by an important difference in specific meaning, since *savoir faire* means knowing how to act in polite society and to do things characteristic of French culture, while American *know how* means knowing how to organize a group or repair machines or to do things characteristic of American culture.

These problems of text and linguistic differences may be illustrated for the English reader of *Job* by commenting on three of the best known verses of the book as they are rendered in the Authorized or King James Version. In 13:14-15, Job is made to say, in what seems to most unprejudiced readers inconsistent language:

> Wherefore do I take my flesh in my teeth
> and put my life in my hand?
> Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him
> but I will maintain mine own ways before Him.

The unsuspecting reader, who may have his own theory about the central theme of *Job*, should be told that the words, "Yet will I trust in Him," are not a rendering of the oldest consonantal Hebrew text that has come down to us, but are based upon the traditional Jewish interpretation, here theologically influenced, perhaps, and upon some of the ancient versions. The oldest Hebrew text reads, "I will not have trust" or, perhaps even more accurately, "I will not wait patiently." If we are to emend the text, we should be more faithful to the context by adopting the suggestion of some modern scholars that we transpose the consonants of the Hebrew verb *'y ḥ l* and read *'ḥ y l*, and render, "I will not tremble."

Another example of the kind of translation that may throw the non-Hebraist off the track of the probable meaning of the original text, occurs in the Authorized Version in 9:20, where Job says to Bildad:

> If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me,
> If I say I am perfect, it shall also prove me perverse.

Here, aside from the fact that God and not *it* is probably the subject of the verb "shall prove me perverse" (which is a single grammatical

form in Hebrew), the rendering "perfect" for Hebrew *tam* gives the wrong impression, since *tam* does not mean "perfect" in the priggish or complacent sense, but rather "innocent" or "of good conscience." Neither here nor elsewhere does Job claim to be wholly without fault. He merely maintains that he is not guilty of such enormous sins as his unsympathetic sympathizers suppose responsible for his misfortunes.

A third familiar rendering may serve to conclude this brief demonstration of the importance of going back to the original text in order to understand the literal and figurative meanings. In 19:23-26, Job concludes his reply to Bildad's second speech by expressing the desire for vindication in his lifetime. The Authorized Version translates verse 25:

> For I know that my Redeemer liveth
> and that he shall stand at the latter day upon the earth.

Here, there are several corrections of the Authorized Version that might be made, but perhaps the single most disturbing rendering is "Redeemer", which inevitably suggests the concept and image of a divine Savior who delivers the soul and body from everlasting death. Such, indeed, was the interpretation of many Jewish and Christian theologians of the past. But the word *go'el,* here boldly rendered "redeemer" (as in the Targum and Vulgate), has the more prosaic meaning of "legal defender" or "vindicator." Moreover, it is not at all unlikely, in my opinion, that the word is not applied here to God, although it is so applied in several passages elsewhere in Scripture. Both the context and a proper feeling for Hebrew usage fully justify us in rendering the verse, "And as for me, would that I might know my vindicator in my lifetime."

II

> Wer den Dichter will verstehen
> Muss in Dichters Lande gehen.

This wise counsel of Goethe, if taken in the wider sense of exploring the spiritual landscape as well as the physical environment of a poet, is not easy to follow in the case of an anonymous work like *Job,* which bears no obvious indications of date or original language or place of composition or literary prototypes. In dealing with these

problems, modern as well as ancient commentators have had to resort to conjecture, and to be content with marking out a large area rather than pointing to a definite locus.

On the evidence of vocabulary and style and stage of theological development, most scholars in recent times[2] have fixed the time of composition of the book between 600 and 300 B.C. Those readers who are impatient of scholarly reservation may be partly satisfied by being told that, in our present state of knowledge, a dating in the fifth century B.C. seems to present fewer difficulties than any other similarly narrow and equally uncertain dating.

The setting of the book and the attitudes of the characters are not obviously Palestinian, and it remains a problem whether the author (or editor) meant "the land of Uz" to indicate a real locality, presumably in Transjordan or Edom, or merely a fictive place. But whether or not the book of *Job* is translated from or modelled after a non-Israelite work, there can be no doubt that, in its present form, it is predominantly Israelite in thought and feeling.

More rewarding than the search for such facts of literary history, however desirable further information about them would be, is the attempt to discover the intellectual setting of the book and its place in the history of ancient near-eastern speculation about the meaning of human suffering and the relation of man to God. One of the most assured results of recent biblical research is the discovery that Hebrew literature was profoundly influenced not only by Mesopotamian writings, as was realized two generations ago, but also by Canaanite and Egyptian forms of belief and expression. The decipherment of ritual and mythical texts of the fourteenth century B.C. found at Ugarit (modern Ras Shamra), on the coast of Syria, has revealed that many of the symbols and poetic devices used in the Prophetic books and in Psalms are derived from Canaanite literature, and also that many Israelite religious ceremonies are modifications of Canaanite rites.[3] Similarly, several passages of biblical Wisdom literature, of

2. An excellent survey of modern discussions of *Job* is given by Robert H. Pfeiffer, *Introduction to the Old Testament* (New York, 1941), pp. 660-92.

3. See, among other works, W. F. Albright, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* (Baltimore, 1942); J. H. Patton, *Canaanite Parallels in the Book of Psalms* (Baltimore, 1944); W. Baumgartner, "Ugaritische Probleme und ihre Tragweite für das Alte Testament", *Theologische Zeitschrift*, III (1947), 81-100.

which *Job* forms a part, have been shown to be translations or adaptations of Egyptian writings.[4]

Let us, then, at least tentatively, explore the landscape of *Job* in this broad, cultural sense, and see what the author's literary predecessors, whether known to him directly or indirectly or not at all, may have said about the great moral problems that concerned him, such as those of human suffering, of the relative merits of life and death, of just or unjust punishment for sin, of divine providence or divine indifference.

In undertaking this brief exploration, we must bear in mind two things: first, that the Egyptian and Mesopotamian Wisdom books which, by good fortune, have been discovered, are probably only a small part of what anciently existed, and second, that the interpretation of these meager remains is even more uncertain than that of the book of *Job*.

Among the extant Egyptian Wisdom books that in some way touch on the themes treated by the author of *Job*, are two that some scholars have considered relevant to our study. One is the so-called *Complaint of the Peasant*, preserved in a papyrus of the Middle Kingdom (*ca.*2000—1600 B.C.).[5] According to the German Egyptologist, Erman, the point of the work seems to be that eloquence is necessary to expose the misconduct of government officials. It is, indeed, difficult for an unprejudiced reader to see much more than an external resemblance to the anguished tone of Job in the cry of appeal to Anubis, made by the peasant who has vainly sought help from a high official. It is even more difficult to be fully persuaded by the Swiss scholar, Humbert, that "the very problem of the book of *Job*, its theodicy, is a philosophical transposition of this demand for justice which forms the basis of the *Complaint of the Peasant*, though here it is limited to human justice."

The second Egyptian book which may, with much greater justice, be considered a literary and philosophical parallel to *Job*, is the so-

4. The material is conveniently summarized by Paul Humbert, *Recherches sur les sources égyptiennes de la littérature sapientale d'Israël* (Neuchatel, 1929). Humbert, however, is too confident about the Egyptian origin of some passages in *Job*.

5. See Adolf Erman, *Literatur der Aegypter* (Leipzig, 1923), pp. 157-75, or the English translation of Erman's book by A. M. Blackman (London, 1927), pp. 161-31.

called *Dialogue of the Life-weary Man with his Soul.*[6] This work of a few hundred lines is also preserved in a papyrus of the Middle Kingdom. There are two formally distinct parts; the first is a dialogue between an unhappy man, perhaps a prospective suicide, and his soul (Egyptian *ba'*) concerning the desirability of death; the second is a collection of four poems in praise of death. Both parts are incompletely preserved and difficult to understand. Moreover, it is not certain that they originally formed a single composition, but, even if they are distinct compositions, they both have some interest for the student of *Job* as at least partial and vague prototypes of the Hebrew poem.

According to Erman, the life-weary man who contemplates suicide is unable to persuade his soul to accompany him in death, because it does not count on being comfortable under the circumstances, and the soul tries to justify its rather calculating decision by appealing to a board of impartial judges. The Dutch scholar, de Buck, thinks that the poem arises from the contrast of two attitudes, one of extreme pessimism, and the other of extreme optimism about life, and that the author, in typical Egyptian fashion, is advocating a compromise between the two extremes. To Weill,

> it remains perfectly certain that at the instant of death the man and the soul which is ready to let him die are in agreement about the fact that death is more or less imminent, and they debate between themselves two theories of death, two ways of considering and imagining it. These two conceptions are those of happy immortality, of which one can assure oneself, and of the total negation of this possibility. And one perceives that the opposition and the philosophic and dogmatic rivalry of these confronted theses are the essential object and spiritual axis of the whole composition.

Here, again, at least one unprejudiced reader must politely demur at laying so heavy a burden of interpretation upon so thin a layer of text. At any rate, there is almost nothing in the first part of the *Dialogue* which compels us to regard it as an anticipation of what is said in the book of *Job* concerning the suffering of the righteous and

6. See Erman, pp. 122-30; Blackman, pp. 86-108. Very helpful are two recent discussions: R. Weill, "Le livre du Désespéré, le sens, l'intention et la composition littéraire de l'ouvrage," *Bulletin de l'Institut français d'Archéologie orientale,* XL (1947), 89-154; A. de Buck, "Inhoud en achtergrond van het gesprek van den levensmoede mit ziyn ziel," *Kernmomenten der antieke beschaving en haar moderne beleving* (Mededeelingen . . . Ex Oriente Lux No. 7, Leiden, 1947), 10-32.

the nature of divine providence. In the appended collection of four poems in praise of death, which is introduced by the statement, "Then I opened my mouth to my soul to answer what it had said," we have a moving treatment of the theme that life is bitter and death is sweet. Moreover, in the life-weary man's lament that his name is abhorred, that "brothers are evil," that the earth is given over to iniquity, and that death is before him "like the fragrance of lotus flowers," we have some faint intimations of the poignancy of *Job,* but hardly more.

That there were many Egyptian poets and thinkers who meditated on the problem of human suffering, we may surmise from the existence of such compositions as this and from other fragmentary remains of Egyptian Wisdom literature, as well as the so-called *Harpers' Laments.* But, so far as we can tell from the fairly well documented *Weltanschauung* of the ancient Egyptians, there was no parallel to the most impressive parts of *Job,* those in which Job confronts a personal God who is the perfect embodiment of that morality, of which in its human form he is the only source.

More clearly related in form and content to the book of *Job* is a Babylonian work probably composed before 1000 B.C. This so-called *Babylonian Theodicy* (also called the *Babylonian Koheleth* by modern scholars; a companion piece, the so-called *Babylonian Job,* is closer in external details to the biblical *Job*) is a dialogue between a disillusioned man and a learned friend who seeks to justify the ways of the gods. The original composition contained twenty-seven strophes of eleven lines each, of which the initial syllables form an acrostic giving the name of the author. Unfortunately, only about half of the poem has been fully preserved; nevertheless, the general sense is much clearer than that of the Egyptian poems referred to above.

According to the convenient though sometimes rather conjectural synopsis furnished by the modern editor, Landsberger,[7] the contents are as follows. The first speaker, who has doubts about the concern of the Babylonian gods for the well-being of their worshippers, turns to a learned man—a theologian we should call him today—for reassurance and consolation. The theologian expresses surprise that his questioner should be plunged into doubt by a temporary setback to

7. See Benno Landsberger, "Die babylonische Theodizee: akrostichisches Zwiegespräch, sog. 'Kohelet,'" *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie,* XLIII (1936), 32-76.

his faith, and tells him that true happiness consists not in the possession of external goods, but in sincere piety. When the doubter objects that the gods do not reward men for performing prescribed acts of ritual (a statement which Landsberger liberally interprets as an indication of disbelief in a "moral order"), the theologian reminds him that wicked and irreligious men must always live in fear of punishment. When the complainant repeats that his piety has been ill rewarded, his learned friend questions the sincerity of his faith. After a break in the tablets covering three strophes, the text resumes with the theologian's complacent assurance, based on his own fortunate experience, that piety is rewarded. To this the doubter impatiently replies that he will seek solitude in order to escape the suffering caused by social contact.

Following another lacuna, the lines of debate shift slightly. The theologian calls attention to the rapid alternation of good luck and bad luck, the transitoriness of worldly prosperity, and the true happiness of pious living. If the complainant has found no comfort in his search for wisdom, it is his own fault, for he lacks true faith. The skeptic argues that there is no justice in a social order which favors the first-born over his brothers. On the contrary, replies the theologian, this very point illustrates the wisdom of the gods, though uninformed men may not understand it. The first-born among men and animals is always inferior in mind or body to those born after him. (Apparently the poet means to imply that the social privileges of the first-born are intended by the gods to be a compensation for his natural inferiority). In reply to the complainant's argument that the rich evildoer is favored over the deserving poor, the theologian can only say that in this point his questioner is right, for that is the way in which the gods made men. Thereupon the skeptic declares himself to be a humble man, and seems to admit that he has been at fault in casting doubt on the wisdom of the gods' treatment of men.

This *Babylonian Theodicy* comes closer than any other extant bit of ancient near-eastern Wisdom writing to the central themes of *Job*,[8] but no modern reader will, I think, be suspected of religious provincialism if he expresses the conviction that the author of the Hebrew

8. See the methodical but somewhat biased treatment of this work and other Babylonian Wisdom poems, such as the *Dialogue Between Slave and Master* and the *Psalm of Lamentation and Thanksgiving*, by Johann Stamm, *Das Leiden des Unschuldigen in Babylon und Israel* (Zürich, 1946).

Wisdom book has touched depths of thought and feeling much more profound than those revealed in the Babylonian poem. In the latter poem, there is no such conflict between a passionate human personality and a powerful divine personality as that which makes the reading of *Job* so moving and chastening. The awesome revelation in *Job* that God has a concern for man's suffering and man's love is far above comparison with the Babylonian theologian's teaching that men must conform to the conventions of ritual and prayer in order to please the gods. Most significant of all the differences between *Job* and the *Babylonian Theodicy* is the absence in the latter of anything like Job's insistent demand that God himself enlighten him as to the cause of human suffering.

So far, we have been exploring (much too hastily) the further background of the intellectual landscape in which the author of *Job* observed and wrote. Although, as I have remarked before, there is no evidence that the Hebrew writer had an exact knowledge of the form and content of such works as have been mentioned, it is instructive to learn that in the cultural milieu of the Israelites (and we must remember the extraordinary receptiveness of the peoples of Semitic culture, especially of the Israelites), there were conscious and artistic expressions of the religious and moral themes that *Job* so magnificently presents.

Moving now from the more remote near-eastern background to the more immediate landscape of Canaanite culture, we find no evidence of the existence among the Phoenicians and other near neighbors of the Israelites of Wisdom literature.[9] We can consider as no more than tentative the theory of Robert H. Pfeiffer that "the thought and language [of *Job*] are characteristically Edomite,"[10] since the few bits of supposedly Edomite literature used by Pfeiffer as a basis of comparison are themselves found in the Hebrew Bible, and are not clearly of Edomite origin. In any case, only the framework of *Job,* the so-

9. W. F. Albright, in "The Role of the Canaanites in the History of Civilization", *Studies in the History of Culture in Honor of Waldo G. Leland* (1942), 11-50, goes so far as to say, "There can no longer be any doubt that the Bible has preserved much of the best in Phoenician literature, especially lyric and gnomic" (p. 50). Even if we were sure of this, we should have to be careful to distinguish between gnomic literature and developed wisdom literature such as we find in *Job*.

10. See Pfeiffer (*op. cit.*) pp. 681-83.

called folk-story, can reasonably be derived from a Canaanite or Edomite source.[11]

So far as the most significant portion of the book is concerned, that portion which reveals the character and thought of Job and God, we must look to earlier Israelite Wisdom literature for orientation. But on this large subject, which in recent times has been the subject of a great number of scholarly studies, we can dwell only long enough to sketch the outlines of the doctrines which the predecessors of the author of *Job* sought to teach.

Here I must pause to remark that it was not the genius of the Hebrews to be as systematic as were the Greeks in the formulation of a religious philosophy. The Hebrews could be systematic in *Halakah,* in the formulation of a social philosophy, and they were not less rational or logical than the Greeks, but they were less objective.

The concept of Wisdom (*ḥokmah* in Hebrew), like most religious and philosophical concepts, underwent a gradual change in Israelite thought that can be discerned at intervals of the successive literary expressions found in the Hebrew Bible. In everyday speech, *ḥokmah* meant worldly wisdom or cleverness or skill in craftsmanship or an understanding of human behavior. Yet these secular meanings were never entirely divorced from the assumption that natural wisdom was a gift of God and ultimately related to divine wisdom. But, in the age of the Prophets, especially those of the Babylonian and Persian periods, partly under the influence of neighboring cultures the word *ḥokmah* took on more elevated meanings. These are, of course, occasionally to be found in the later Psalms and in the prophecies of Second Isaiah, but are best known from their occurrence in those books of the Old Testament and Apocrypha specifically known as Wisdom Literature, namely *Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes, Sirach,* and *The Wisdom of Solomon.*

Among the related but recognizably distinct later connotations of *ḥokmah,* we find two primary meanings with their several variations. One of these presents *ḥokmah* as an attribute of the pious man who obeys the commands of God found in scriptural law or *Torah,* and is rewarded by having his natural wisdom enriched by the wisdom of

11. Ingenious, but rather too speculative, is the study by Shalom Spiegel, "Noah, Danel and Job: Touching the Canaanite Relics in the Legends of the Jews," *Louis Ginzberg Jubilee Volume* (New York, 1945), I, 305-55.

God. The other presents the Divine Wisdom as a sort of intermediary between God and man, sometimes identified with *Torah,* sometimes identified with the Word of God, sometimes described as a quasi-personal force, mysterious and remote. In this concept of the heavenly Wisdom, the Israelites came as close to the Logos doctrines of Hellenistic-Oriental theology and Greek philosophy as it was possible for such essentially unobjective and unmetaphysical thinkers to come.

The author of *Job,* therefore, seems to take for granted that his readers are acquainted with Israelite doctrines of Wisdom, especially with the theory that the man who obeys the commands of *Torah* and lives righteously will be rewarded in this life with some form of material prosperity as well as spiritual gifts. The poet also seems to be aware that some of his contemporaries were coming to believe that God might reward the righteous and punish the wicked in another life. Though this belief became a cardinal doctrine of Judaism only with the emergence of the Pharisaic group in the Maccabean period, there is reason to suppose that it had begun to take hold of both theologians and unlearned believers some centuries earlier. Among the Canaanites, as among the Egyptians and other peoples of the ancient Near East, the notion had prevailed that the personality survives the death of the body, but among the Israelites this notion had been deliberately discouraged by priests and prophets who feared its pagan associations. Nevertheless, partly as a result of political insecurity, and partly under Persian influence, there began to develop, side by side with the belief in a national restoration, the idea that righteous individuals who suffered in this life would be rewarded in the next. Although, as I have said, this notion became a dogma only in the Maccabean period, the very fact that the authors of *Job* and *Ecclesiastes* reject the idea so repeatedly and insistently seems to indicate that many Jews of the Persian period accepted it.

But the author of *Job* was clearly not satisfied either with the concept of human wisdom as guaranteeing an earthly reward to the pious and law-observant man, or with the more mystical belief that God's wisdom would bring surcease from suffering either in this world or the next. He was looking for something more realistic than the mystical hopes expressed in some of the Psalms and in the eighth chapter of *Proverbs,* and more mystical than the prudential realism of most of the book of *Proverbs.*

III

In the preceding section, we have had a glimpse, admittedly brief and unsatisfying, of the intellectual landscape in which the author of *Job* moved and meditated. Let us now turn to the form and intention of his own work, not with confidence that we shall learn exactly where he got his literary materials and ideas, but merely with the hope that we shall understand a little more clearly what was personal and original in his thinking as opposed to that of his contemporaries. That he was, in fact, an original thinker hardly anyone can doubt who is familiar with the contents of the Hebrew Bible.

The composition of the book of *Job* is an involved problem about which competent scholars still find themselves in partial disagreement. But certain natural divisions or literary units are immediately apparent upon a first reading. The book is introduced and concluded by a prose narrative, the folk-story, as it is usually called, which makes up chapters 1, 2 and 42.

This folk-story tells us that Job, a pious man, lived happily with his family and possessions until Satan (whose name in Hebrew means "accuser" or "adversary") wagered God that Job would give up his piety if he were to lose his children and property. But, in spite of the misfortune visited upon him, Job continues to bless the name of God. When Satan is rebuked by God for suggesting that Job's piety is motivated only by self-interest, Satan coolly suggests that if Job's own body is afflicted, he will curse God. Satan is permitted to make the test, but a second time Job refuses to "sin with his lips" and persists in piously accepting evil as well as good at the hand of God.

Job's suffering brings him a visit of condolence from three of his friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar. The content of their remarks is not preserved in the folk-story, but we must suppose from the nature of the separate Dialogue that they attributed his suffering to some disregard of divine law. In the concluding part of the folk-story, God rebukes Job's friends for misinterpreting the cause of his suffering, and commands them to make atonement by sacrifice, while directing Job to pray for them. He then rewards Job for his patience by giving him twice as much as he had before and blessing him with long life and children and children's children to the fourth generation.

Within this narrative setting, which gives no hint of an argument or debate between Job and God, is found the Dialogue in metrical

form. It is introduced by Job's lament in chapter 3 and is concluded by God's speeches "out of the whirlwind" and Job's confession of ignorance and repentance in chapters 38-42. The Dialogue, however, like the whole book, appears to be composite rather than a single literary unit. While there is nothing like unanimity among scholars on the number and extent of the several portions, there is a large measure of agreement that the cycles of speeches by Job and his three friends in chapters 3-31 are distinct from the speeches of Elihu in chapters 32-37, and that the latter have no formal connection with the earlier part of the Dialogue (Elihu's existence being ignored) and are different in language and style. Furthermore, it is obvious that the cycles of speeches in chapters 3-31, as originally written, must have contained eighteen speeches, three by each of the three friends and nine replies by Job, but, in the present form of the text, the last cycle of speeches is incomplete and disarranged. Then, too, the praise of Wisdom in chapter 28 is considered by some scholars to be extraneous to the central portion of the book, as are a good many verses in chapters 38-42 which contain the speech of God. Finally, it should be mentioned that even conservative scholars are prepared to admit the interpolation and rearrangement of occasional verses in that part of the book regarded by all critics as original.

From this brief analysis, it will be seen that our interpretation of the author's meaning must depend, to some extent, upon our determination of how much has been added to the original work of the poet whose style and thought are recognizable in the debate between Job and his friends. One thing, however, is certain, namely, that the heart of the matter which was the poet's chief concern is to be found in Job's lament and speeches and in the first part of God's reply to Job. We shall also do well to remember that Job's replies to the arguments of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar are addressed to God as much as to his friends. We are therefore justified, I think, in basing our interpretation of Job upon the twenty chapters in which Job and God are the speakers, that is, chapters 3, 6-7, 9-10, 12-14, 16-17, 23-24, 27, 29-31, 38-39, 40 in part and 42 in part.

It will, however, help us to appreciate the poet's originality in style and thought if we first consider the literary and theological problems presented by the folk-story in chapters 1-2 and 42.

That there was a legendary person called Job, we know from the

verses in the fourteenth chapter of the book of *Ezekiel* which name Job together with Noah and Daniel as exemplars of righteousness.[12] But how much of the assumed early story about a righteous man named Job who remained pious in the face of great suffering was known to the author of the Dialogue, and what picturesque details he may have added to it, and whether he used it as merely a decorative setting for his dramatic poem to awaken the curiosity of unphilosophical readers, or took over a popular story with the ironical intention of exposing its superficial and defective morality—these are all questions which may never be fully answered.

The striking figure of the Adversary as a personal enemy of mankind, from his first appearance as Satan in *Job* (or perhaps in *Zechariah* 3:2) to his engaging final appearance as the sophisticated Mephistopheles in Goethe's *Faust* has led some students of our book to attribute to him more importance than his earliest history warrants. The Satan of the folk-story of *Job,* though he politely sneers at God, is no Mephistopheles matching wits with *der alte Herr,* nor is he the principle of evil evenly matched with the principle of good, as is Angra Mainyu with Ahura Mazda in Iranian mythology. Satan is merely a more personalized form of the shadowy "evil spirits" occasionally mentioned in earlier narratives of the Old Testament as agents of God in testing men's sincerity of belief or action. At any rate, it was the understanding of the author of the Dialogue that God himself and not Satan was the adversary whom Job believed himself to be facing.

Some modern readers have been shocked by the notion that an omnipotent God should so callously bring extreme suffering upon a good man like Job. But two things may be said in depreciation of such shocked concern. In the first place, we should not be ungrateful enough to forget that the moral standards by which we condemn the seeming immorality of some passages in the Old Testament have themselves been taken from other passages of the Old Testament. In spite of their belief in the Mosaic revelation, Israelite theologians, from the time of the early kingdom on, learned to think more wisely and humanely than their predecessors of the Mosaic age. In the second place, as we shall see in a moment, even the most advanced Christian thought has not got far beyond the ancient Israelite idea that God

12. *Ibid.*

has the moral right to demand the utmost sacrifice of his worshipers.

This does not mean that biblical writers were insensitive to the suffering involved in this strict doctrine. We know, for example, that the story in Genesis about Abraham's intended sacrifice of his beloved son Isaac was, in large part, an etiological story designed to explain the substitution of animal for human sacrifices in the Israelite cult. But it is also clear that the writer of this story believed that only a man who is prepared to give to God all that is dear to him is entitled to a divine reward, and that God does not try men beyond their power to endure suffering.

Nevertheless, a contemporary moralist may insist, there is something abhorrent to our feeling in the notion of a God so exacting and jealous in his demand of absolute obedience that he beats a good man like Job to his knees merely to convince a skeptic like Satan that Job really is obedient to his God. Would it not have been more reasonable for God to afflict the numberless wicked and disobedient men? This is not quite the same as the ancient question, why do the wicked prosper, but rather the question, Why does God select innocent and vulnerable people as undeserving victims of his moral experiments?

To this question the author of the folk-story has not given an answer. All that he tells us, at least in what remains of the story, is that truly pious men must accept suffering without reproaching God. But even the most refined and learned speculation of our own time has not given us a wholly satisfying answer, certainly none more satisfying than the answer given by the poet who wrote the Dialogue in *Job*, which I shall try to interpret a little further on.

Of recent moralizings on the problem of divine providence and human suffering, I know of no philosopher or theologian who has spoken more eloquently or movingly than Father Paneloux, a character in Albert Camus' recent novel *La Peste*.[13] Camus describes the physical and moral suffering caused by a plague that is imagined to have struck the city of Oran. A thoughtful priest, Father Paneloux, preaches a traditional sermon in the cathedral to prove to his congregation that the plague is a punishment for their sins. But when the priest himself spends an agonized night by the bedside of a stricken infant and watches him die in torment, he is forced to search for a

13. Albert Camus, *La Peste* (Paris, 1947), pp. 247-48.

more profound explanation. In a second sermon, he revises his theology and speaks in part as follows:

Le Père disait au même instant que la vertu d'acceptation totale dont il parlait ne pouvait être comprise au sens restreint qu'on lui donnait d'ordinaire, qu'il ne s'agissait pas de la banale résignation, ni même de la difficile humilité. Il s'agissait d'humiliation mais d'une humiliation où l'humilié était consentant. Certes, la souffrance d'un enfant était humiliante pour l'esprit et le coeur. Mais c'est pourquoi il fallait y entrer. Mais c'est pourquoi, et Paneloux assura son auditoire que ce qu'il allait dire n'était pas facile à dire, il fallait la vouloir parce que Dieu la voulait. Ainsi seulement le chrétien n'épargnerait rien et, toutes issues fermées, irait au fond du choix essentiel. Il choisirait de tout croire pour ne pas être reduit à tout nier. . . . On ne pouvait dire: "Cela je le comprends, mais ceci est inacceptable," il fallait sauter au coeur de cet inacceptable qui nous était offert, justement pour que nous fissions notre choix. La souffrance des enfants était notre pain amer, mais sans ce pain notre âme périrait de sa faim spirituelle.

But this means that, while God graciously allows us to satisfy our own spiritual hunger by eating bitter bread, he causes an infant, who knows no spiritual hunger, to eat bread just as bitter. The imaginary sermon is magnificent and forceful, but it does not go beyond the wisdom of the story of Abraham and Isaac or the folk-story of Job.

The bewilderment of senstive believers of our own day at the inexplicable sufferings of the innocent young is poignantly expressed by a Job-like character, Scobie, in a recent novel of the Catholic writer, Graham Greene.[14] As he watches an unconscious child being brought ashore from the boat of a ship sunk at sea during the war, Scobie exclaims

"It's terrible."

"What is terrible?"

"A child like that."

"Yes. Both parents were lost. But it is all right. She will die."

Scobie watched the bearers go slowly up the hill, their bare feet very gently flapping the ground. He thought: it would need all Father Brûle's ingenuity to explain that. Not that the child would die: that needed no explanation. Even the pagans realized that the love of God might mean an early death, though the reason they ascribed was different, but that the child should have been allowed to survive the forty days and nights in the open boat—that was the mystery, to reconcile that with the love of God.

And yet he could believe in no God who was not human enough to love what he had created.

14. *The Heart of the Matter* (New York, 1948), pp. 124-25.

We have given this much study to the folk-story of Job in order to suggest what was "the root of the matter" to which the author of the Dialogue addressed himself, and to show how little help he could have got from his predecessors and contemporaries in finding an answer to the agonizing question, why do the righteous suffer?

It is now time to turn to the Dialogue to try to learn from the speeches of Job himself what was in his mind and heart, thus treating Job as a real person rather than a character in a story. If we read these chapters separately, without resorting to drastic emendation except where the text is generally regarded as corrupt, we see that there are three principal themes in Job's argument. We also see that Job shows a surprising amount of dramatic as well as logical consistency throughout the alternation of these themes. Sometimes he combines the three themes, sometimes he repeats a theme at intervals with a change of tone. Job confronts God in a variety of attitudes, but always with the same ultimate intention. Sometimes he is suppliant, sometimes plaintive, sometimes righteously indignant, sometimes even defiant. It is natural that each theme should have its appropriate tone, but there is an occasional change of tone within the same theme.

The first of these themes, which is most often found in the earlier speeches, though it is sometimes echoed or implied in later passages, is Job's plea to be released by death from his suffering. A variation of this theme is his regret at ever having been born. The passages (outside the introductory lament) in which this thought is most clearly expressed are the following:

3:11-13

Why did I not die from the womb,
And in coming forth from the belly expire?
Why did the knees receive me,
Or why the breasts that I should suck?
For else[15] I should have lain down and been quiet.
I should have slept and then have had rest.

3:20-23

Why does He give light to the weary,
And life to the bitter of soul,
Who long for death, which comes not,
And search for it more than for treasure,
Who are glad with jubilation
And rejoice when they find the grave?

15. More literally, "now."

6:8-9

Would that my prayer were granted,[16]
And God would give what I hope for!
And that God would consent to crush me,
Would loose His hand and cut me off!

7:15-16

My soul chooses strangling
And death rather than my pains.[17]
Let me go under![18] Not for ever would I live.
Let me be, for my days are fleeting.

10:19

I would be as though I had never been.
From the womb I should have been brought to the grave.

Whether the poet meant us to suppose that Job's longing for death was less urgent as he went on to argue his case, is not easy to determine, but it is natural to conjecture that, if he saw no prospect of vindication, he would prefer the oblivion of death to the ignominy of life.

The second theme, which to me seems the most original and significant one in the book, is Job's accusation, sometimes despairing, sometimes gently ironical, sometimes sarcastically bitter, that God is mercilessly persecuting him, is pressing him like an implacable enemy rather than passing sentence on him with judicial calm. Job is protesting against the monstrousness of the disparity between the divine omnipotence and his own mortal weakness. Here Job, while still partly on the defensive, dares to accuse God of taking an almost sadistic pleasure in causing suffering to man, a suffering out of all proportion to his sinfulness, whatever that may have been.

This theme is illustrated by the following passages:

6:4

For the arrows of the Almighty are in me,
The venom of which my spirit drinks.
The terrors of God are arrayed against me.

16. Lit., "might come."

17. Reading, with many scholars, *'aṣbôtay,* "my pains," instead of Masoretic *'aṣmôtay,* "my bones."

18. Taking *m's* in the sense of *mss,* "to melt away."

7:11-12

As for me, I will not hold my mouth.
I will speak in my anguish of spirit.
I will talk out in my bitterness of soul.
Am I Yam or Tannin[19]
That Thou settest a watch over me?

7:17-19

What is man that Thou shouldst make much of him.
That Thou shouldst give him any thought,
That Thou shouldst visit him every morning
And at every moment try him?
How long wilt Thou not look away from me
Nor let me be till I swallow my spittle?

9:13-18

God does not stay His anger.
Beneath Him lie low Rahab's helpers.
How much less shall I answer Him then?
How shall I choose my words to Him?
Even if I were in the right, I should get no answer[20]
When I supplicate my judge.[21]
If I called Him and He answered me,
I would not believe that He harkens to my voice.
For He crushes me for a trifle[22]
And multiplies my wounds without cause.
He does not let me get my breath,
But gives me my fill of bitterness.

13:20-22

Only two things do not do to me.
Then will I not hide from Thy face.
Remove Thy hand from me,
And let Thy terror not affright me.
Then call, and I will answer,
Or else I will speak, and Thou shalt reply.

19. Mythological creatures, now better known from Ugarit texts. A. V. renders, "Am I a sea or a whale?"

20. Reading, with some ancient versions, *lō' 'e'ānéh*, "I shall not be answered," instead of Masoretic *lō' 'e'néh*, "I will not answer".

21. Reading, with some modern scholars, *mišpʰti*, "my judge" or "my legal adversary," instead of Masoretic *mišpāti*, "my judgment."

22. Lit. "for a hair." I follow some ancient versions and modern scholars in reading *śa'ʿrāh* instead of Masoretic *śʷārāh* "storm."

13:25

Wilt Thou terrify a driven leaf,
And wilt Thou pursue dry straw?

16:9

In His wrath He has torn me and hated me
And has gnashed His teeth at me.

16:12-14

I was at peace, and He shattered me
And He seized me by the neck and smashed me to bits.
And He set me up as His target.
His arrows are all around me.
He cleaves my reins and shows no mercy.
He spills out my gall on the ground.
He breaks me, breach upon breach.
He runs upon me like a great warrior.

19:6-11

Know, therefore, that God has wronged me,
And has thrown His net about me.
If I cry, Violence!, I shall get no answer.
If I call aloud, there is no judgment.
He has barred my way, I cannot pass.
And on my paths He has set darkness.
My glory from me He has stripped,
And He has taken the crown from my head.
He has broken me down on every side, and I am lost.
And He has uprooted my hope like a tree.
His wrath is kindled against me,
And He counts me as one of His foes.

23:13-16

And if He chooses[23] a thing, who can turn Him back?
And if His soul desires a thing, He does it.
For He attains His end,[24]
And many such things are with Him.
Therefore am I terrified before Him.
I consider, and I am afraid of Him.
For God has made my heart faint,
And the Almighty has terrified me.

23. Reading, with some modern scholars, *bāḥar,* "chooses," instead of Masoretic *bᵉ'eḥād,* "(is) in one."

24. Reading, with some ancient versions, *ḥuqqô,* "his end," instead of Masoretic *ḥuqqî,* "my end."

30:19-21

He has thrown me into the mud,
And I have become like dust and ashes.
I call aloud to Thee but Thou dost not answer me.
I stand[25] but Thou regardest me not.[26]
Thou hast turned into one cruel to me.
With the might of Thy hand Thou pursuest me.

These passages may serve to show how steadfastly and stubbornly the harassed Job accuses God of misusing his divine power to crush a defenseless man who is bewildered by his fury and is unable to understand why God so relentlessly pursues him.

The third principle theme in the speeches of Job is the insistence upon his innocence and integrity, if not complete, at least substantial. Alternating with this assertion is his plea, sometimes a demand, that God bring him to trial and give him an opportunity to speak in his own defense rather than ignore him or condemn him unheard. From several passages in which this theme appears we may select the following:

7:20

If I have sinned, what do I do to Thee,
O keeper of men?

9:2-3

In truth I know that it is so.
For how can a man be just before God?
If he wishes to dispute with him,
He[27] will not answer once in a thousand times.

9:32-35

For He is not a man like me that I should answer Him,
That we should come together in judgment.
There is no arbiter[28] between us
Who might place his hand upon us both.
Let Him take His rod from upon me,
And let not His terror confuse me.
Let me speak and not have to fear Him,
For (else) am I not true to myself.[29]

25. *I.e.*, in prayer or supplication.

26. The "not" is found in only one Hebrew *MS.*, but is supplied by the Vulgate and is required by the context, as most scholars recognize.

27. The context suggests that God, not man, is the subject of this half-verse.

28. The Greek and Syriac versions read, "Would that there were an arbiter."

29. The meaning of this last half-verse is obscure, but the rendering here given is faithful to the Masoretic text.

13:3

But as for me, I would speak to the Almighty,
And to argue with God is my wish.

13:14-15

I will take[30] my flesh in my teeth,
And my life I will put in my hand.[31]
If He kills[32] me, I will not wait patiently,[33]
But will argue my course to His face.

13:22-23

Call, and I will answer,
Or, if I speak, do Thou reply to me.
How many are my sins and transgressions?
My fault and transgression make known to me.

19:7

If I call, Violence!, I get no answer.
I cry out, and there is no judgment.

23:3-5

Would that I knew and might find Him,
And come to His abode.
I would prepare my case before Him,
And my mouth I would fill with arguments.
I would know with what words He would answer me,
And understand what He would say to me.

23:10-12

He knows my going and my standing.[34]
He has tested me, and I have come out like gold.
In His steps my foot has followed.
His way have I kept and not gone aside.
From the commands of His lips I have not departed.
In my breast[35] I have stored the words of His mouth.

30. The words *'al-māh* preceding *'eśśā'*, "I will take," are not found in the Greek version and are, today, generally regarded as a meaningless repetition of the words, *'alay māh*, which conclude the preceding verse.

31. *I.e.*, "I will risk my life."

32. Heb. *qāṭal*, like "kill" in colloquial English, can also mean "to injure."

33. So the consonantal Masoretic text (or *Kethib*), reading *lô' 'ayaḥel*. The revised, vocalic Masoretic text (or *Qere*) reads *lô 'yaḥel*, "I will trust in Him." Some scholars would emend the consonantal text to read *lô' 'āḥîl*, "I will not tremble," citing the parallel in 9:35.

34. Reading, with Syriac, *w^e 'omdî*, "and my standing," for Masoretic *'immadî*, "with me."

35. Reading, with Greek and Vulgate, *b^eḥêqî*, "in my breast," for Masoretic *meḥuqqî*, "from my statute."

27:5-6

Far be it from me to say you are right.
Until I die I will not put away my integrity from me.
To my righteousness I hold fast and will not let it go.
My heart will feel no shame[36] all my days.

From the foregoing passages, we see that the burden of Job's complaint is threefold. First, he pleads to be released from his suffering. Second, he charges that his suffering is inflicted by an all-powerful being relentlessly persecuting a creature much too weak to bear the weight of it. Third, he insists that he has not been given a fair trial or the right to face his divine accuser and judge. Job is convinced that, if he is not sinless, he has, at least, sufficient integrity to answer any charge which God may bring, if he will but bring a charge.

In God's answer to Job lies "the root of the matter." What is the plain meaning (the *peshaṭ,* as the rabbinic commentators would call it) of chapters 38-40 and 42, in which the poet makes God speak to Job out of the whirlwind? Whatever meaning we may have succeeded in reading out of Job's speeches, which, we remember, are addressed primarily to God and only incidentally to his friends, ought to be a dramatic and logical preparation for the divine utterance.[37]

Most of the verses now generally recognized to be part of God's reply are not too obscure or textually difficult in themselves. It is their seeming irrelevance to the speeches of Job that causes most readers perplexity. God seems to ignore the question in the mind of Job as in that of any thoughtful man, Why do the wicked prosper, and the righteous suffer? He gives no direct reply to Job's insistent question, What great wrong have I committed that you punish me so terribly?

Must we, then, assume, with almost all critics, that God is ironical in asking Job whether he has an arm like God's or can thunder with a voice like God's or adorn himself with glory and honor like God? I think not. I cannot believe that our ironical and psychologically acute poet would make the artistic and moral blunder of ascribing irony at this point to a God whom Job has all along described as infinitely greater than himself. Where would the irony be?

36. The meaning of the verb *yeḥ'raph* is uncertain.

37. Unless we agree with Duncan Macdonald, *The Hebrew Literary Genius* (Princeton, 1933), p. 31, in holding that "the whole philosophical attitude to the world and to man of the Speech of the Lord is different from that of the Colloquies."

In what sense does God give Job an answer? And how satisfying is the answer to Job, to the poet, to us? First, I shall try to phrase in the simplest terms what the poet seems to report God as saying. It is that God is so much involved in trying to control the demonic forces of the universe which he has created, rules and cares for, that he has, so to speak, neither time nor inclination to look out especially for Job, let alone persecute him.

Strange as it may seem in so Hebraic a book as *Job,* God is constrained though not defeated by Necessity, even as the Creator God of Plato is constrained by *anankē.*[38] One need not suppose that the author of *Job* was familiar with Greek literature in general or with Plato in particular.[39] His theology seems to stem from his imaginative insight rather than from a philosophical training.

What comfort, then, can God give Job, and what instruction can the poet of *Job* give his troubled readers? What is the meaning of the passage, 40:7-14, that seems to have formed part of the original conclusion of God's reply to Job?

> Gird now thy loins like a man.
> I will question thee and thou shalt tell Me.
> Wilt thou indeed annul My judgment,
> And condemn Me that thou mayest be right?
> Hast thou an arm like God's,
> And canst thou thunder with a voice like His?
> Adorn thyself now with pride and greatness,
> And clothe thyself with honor and splendor.
> Extend the reach of thy anger,
> And when thou seest a proud man, humble him,
> When thou seest a proud man, subdue him,
> And crush the wicked where they stand.

38. See the discussion of Platonic passages in Simone Pétrement, *Le dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens* (Paris, 1947), pp. 39-45. Mlle. Pétrement remarks that Plato does not represent Necessity as hostile to the supreme god. Even in Gnosticism, she believes, the "ruler of the world" is not essentially an enemy of God; "he is the guardian of an inferior order, who is ignorant of the order of the good."

39. With the resemblances and differences between *Job* and the Greek Prometheus myth, and with the problem of Oriental and Greek culture-hero motifs in relation to the story of Job (who is, of course, not a culture-hero), I hope to deal on another occasion. In this connection, I should like to express disagreement with the current tendency to minimize the differences between primitive myth (as defined by Malinowski) and the literary and social myths of more developed societies. On this subject see Abram Kardiner, *The Individual and His Society* (New

Bury them in the earth together,[40]
And bind their persons in a hidden place.
Then I myself will acknowledge to thee
That thine own right hand will save thee.

The poet is saying, I think, that just as God exerts his heroic will to subdue the demonic elements in the universe and to sustain his creation by bringing light to the stars, rain to the sea and land, and food to all living creatures, so man must exert his will to subdue evil and overcome frustration. This is an *imitatio Dei* of a different kind from that preached by most Judeo-Christian and Oriental theologians.[41] It is an exhortation to emulate God's unconquerable will.[42] I hope I shall not be suspected of speaking *ad captum plebis* (which is, perhaps, no great sin) if I say that the author of *Job* was the first Existentialist.

York, 1939), pp. 105-7, and Robert Bierstedt, "The Limitations of Anthropological Methods in Sociology," *The American Journal of Sociology*, LIV (1948), 22-30.

40. The verb *ṭāman*, "to bury," used here, is also used in Ex.2:12, which tells how Moses "buried in the sand" the cruel Egyptian whom he had slain in righteous anger. I believe that the author of *Job* had this passage in mind.

41. As illustrated by the passages cited in such recent works as Aldous Huxley's *Perennial Philosophy* and several articles by the late Ananda K. Coomaraswamy.

42. A separate paper would be required to discuss the essential differences between the Hebrew God and Zeus. Here I venture only to remark that, while Zeus and the other Greek gods are visible and knowable, they are humanly remote and seen, as it were, through glass. Yahweh is hidden in a mist or a cloud or a whirlwind, but he is known as a person. Moreover, Yahweh is a jealous God, but he is never envious. Zeus and his fellow-gods are not given to the passion of jealousy, but they are notoriously envious of man (*phthoneroi*).

BROWNING'S HEAVEN

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Despite an ominous title, this essay will not revive the Victorian conception of Browning as a profound spiritual seer. On the other hand, it does not unreservedly accept Santayana's picture of the poet as an utter barbarian. If Browning sang the glory of the imperfect too noisily and undiscriminatingly, he did so partly to shout down his painful hankering for a perfection unattainable in this life. For evidence on this point, we recall the last five stanzas of Part VI of "James Lee's Wife." Here the fact of mutability ("Nothing can be as it has been before") denies the unquenchable longing "To draw one beauty into our heart's core, /And keep it changeless." That is what we want, and that is what we never get. How then is this "old woe o' the world" to be confronted? With a courage so robust that it seems to turn defeat into victory:

> . . . Rejoice that man is hurled
> From change to change unceasingly,
> His soul's wings never furled!

But, however bravely we may try to rejoice in our lack of joy, the fact remains that

> Nothing endures: the wind moans, saying so;
> We moan in acquiescence: there's life's pact,
> Perhaps probation—do *I* know?
> God does: endure his act!

And yet this acceptance of God's inscrutable will can never assuage man's feeling that it is

> . . . bitter not to grave
> On his soul's hands' palms one fair good wise thing
> Just as he grasped it!

These lines do not support the thesis that Browning never desired anything but uncritical immersion in flux.

For one who accepted the Christian doctrine of immortality, the solution seemed obvious: there must be a heavenly perfection to com-

plete the imperfection of this life. "Only grant," he writes in "La Saisiaz,"

> Only grant a second life, I acquiesce
> In this present life a failure, count misfortune's worst assaults
> Triumph, not defeat, assured that loss so much the more exalts
> Gain about to be.

Abt Vogler sums it up in a single line: "On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven, a perfect round." Imperfection here and perfection hereafter. The fulness with which we obtain the latter depends on how manfully we grapple with the former. The idea of divine wisdom and goodness cannot be reconciled with the world as it is

> If you bar me from assuming earth to be a pupil's place,
> And life, time,—with all their chances, changes,—just
> probation-space.
>
> ("La Saisiaz")

But since our mortal life is the gift of an all-loving God, it is *Life in a Love*. It "means intensely, and means good." Its inadequacies are not curses, but challenges to noble striving and failing and striving again. For Browning, the strongest argument for the existence of the next world was the badness of this. A badness which authenticates immortality can be, must be, experienced as goodness. The more robustly one glorified imperfection here, the more one assured oneself of perfection hereafter. The price of victory was defeat. One passed God's earthly examination by flunking it:

> For thence,—a paradox
> Which comforts while it mocks,—
> Shall life succeed in that it seems to fail.
>
> ("Rabbi Ben Ezra")

Hence the earth-heaven contrast is, after all, a contrast not between evil and good, but between two radically inconsistent conceptions of goodness—the goodness of broken arcs and the goodness of the perfect round. To explain why Browning, through earnestly desiring the latter, turned more and more in the direction of the former would demand a book rather than an essay. Important factors were his sanguine temper, his immense vitality, his omnivorous appetite for vicarious ex-

perience, his tendency to think that whatever in life or art was finished was therefore dead. He rightly believed that the artist could render soul only through body; "the value and significance of flesh" was spiritual value and significance. But the equilibrium of this position was precarious. Flesh—the earthly life of aspiration, struggle, failure, renewal of struggle—was the resistant medium of his craft, and he delighted in it. On the other hand, although he had spiritual aspirations, he had no spiritual images: his religious beliefs were earnest but inconsistent, worried, and cloudy—the beliefs of a "broad" Nonconformist intellectual of the Victorian era. The goodness of the broken arcs was real and vivid to him; the goodness of the perfect round was a beneficent dream. Hence he found it difficult to believe in heavenly flesh without believing also in fleshly heaven. He illustrates the grim title of Isaac Watts's hymn, "The Hazard of Loving the Creatures."

For Browning, heavenly perfection seldom if ever implies any essential difference in *kind* of activity between this world and the next: there will simply be an opportunity to carry on more satisfyingly the human work which has fallen short of its goal. "Nothing has been which shall not bettered be /Hereafter"—the emphasis is on projection of an improved human life beyond the grave, rather than a radical transformation of being. Only in this sense, does the Grammarian say that it is "God's task to make the heavenly period /Perfect the earthen." For the old scholar, the value of immortality lies in the promise of unlimited time for the annotation of classical texts: "What's time? Leave Now for dogs and apes! /Man has Forever." Similarly in "Old Pictures in Florence," the obscure failures feel no envy of the painters who have won fame on earth:

> We are faulty—why not? we have time in store.
>
> . . . .
>
> What's come to perfection, perishes.
> Things learned on earth, we shall practise in heaven.

There is nothing to indicate that this celestial continuation of human work is ever to attain the bliss of finality. If one commits oneself whole-heartedly to the glory of the imperfect as regards this life, one may end by applying even to heavenly life the principle, "What's come to perfection, perishes." Andrea del Sarto cries, "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,/Or what's a heaven for?" The closing

lines of his monologue reveal his personal conception of heaven—unlimited opportunity to paint frescoes on "Four great walls in the New Jerusalem." But, in earthly life, Andrea's painting has been "faultless"; having come to perfection, it has perished; he has lacked the courage to attempt more than he can do. I do not see how his soul can be redeemed unless he is granted an eternity of the noble striving and failing which he has missed on earth.

"Old Pictures in Florence," already cited, shows that Browning, as an artist who delights in the rich diversity of appearances, shrinks from an after-life in which the human countenance could express

> . . . no more play and action
> Than joy which is crystallized for ever,
> Or grief, an eternal petrifaction.

He is, on the contrary, rather attracted by the notion

> That, when this life is ended, begins
> New work for the soul in another state
> Where it strives and gets weary, loses and wins:
> Where the strong and the weak this world's congeries
> Repeat in large what they practised in small,
> Through life after life in unlimited series;
> Only the scale's to be changed, that's all.

The penultimate line suggests that he is talking about transmigration rather than about a peculiarly strenuous heaven. What is important for us in the passage is Browning's insistence on the value of imperfection even after death. In the next stanza, however, he partly retracts this extravagance:

> Yet I hardly know. When a soul has seen
> By the means of Evil that Good is best,
> And, through earth and its noise, what is heaven's serene,—
>
> . . . .
>
> Why, the child grown man, you burn the rod,
> The uses of labour are surely done;
> There remaineth a rest for the people of God:
> And I have had troubles enough, for one.

This half-whimsical recognition of the desirability of a little peace and quiet beyond the grave is rare in Browning. Much more charac-

teristic is his explicit repudiation of static bliss in "Rephan." Here an angel who has been granted the high privilege of dwelling among men describes his pre-existence, "When my home was the Star of my God Rephan"—not apparently the Almighty, but some subordinate deity who does not fully appreciate the glory of the imperfect. In this starry life, there was neither too much nor too little of anything, no growth or change, no awareness of better or worse, no hope or fear—nothing but unruffled serenity. No Browning angel could long endure such a place. Soon he yearns for variety, movement, incompleteness, aspiration, stimulating failure:

> Oh, gain were indeed to see above
> Supremacy ever—to move, remove,
>
> Not reach—aspire yet never attain
> To the object aimed at!

In response to this desire, the voice of a higher God than Rephan addresses the angel:

> . . . So wouldst thou strive, not rest?
>
> Burn and not smoulder, win by worth,
> Not rest content with a wealth that's dearth?
> Thou art past Rephan, thy place be Earth!

Now, happy on earth, the angel rather puzzlingly reproaches man for his lack of faith:

> Have you no assurance that, earth at end,
> Wrong will prove right? Who made shall mend
> In the higher sphere to which yearnings tend?

Apparently, earthly struggle may win a better heaven than that from which the angel has escaped, but how this "higher sphere" will differ, on the one hand, from Rephan's star and, on the other hand, from mortal life is impossible to say. One can only be sure that there will be plenty of vigorous activity.

If the perfect round of Browning's heaven sometimes shattered into broken arcs, there were, conversely, moments on this side of the grave possessing a peculiarly satisfying quality which transcended the probationary struggle and muddle. The "good minute"—the phrase is drawn from "Two in the Campagna," but the idea frequently appears

elsewhere—is not a glimpse of peace wholly detached from the flux, but rather a concentrated spurt of vital energy so intense that it gives the illusion of being better than it needs to be for any instrumental purpose and, therefore, a pure good in itself. It is that flash of complete self-expression

> When a soul declares itself—to wit,
> By its fruit, the thing it does!
> ("By the Fireside")

The good minute may be provided by creative achievement in art or by patriotic self-sacrifice. Pre-eminently, however, it is associated with physical love: the summum bonum, as everyone knows, is "the kiss of one girl." Indeed, such a lyric as "Now" implies that the good minute par excellence is the sexual act.

But the bliss of "Now" is shadowed by the question, "How long such suspension may linger?" Not very long, as we see in the less explicit "Two in the Campagna":

> . . . I kiss your cheek,
> Catch your soul's warmth,—I pluck the rose
> And love it more than tongue can speak—
> Then the good minute goes.
>
> Already how am I so far
> Out of that minute? Must I go
> Still like the thistle-ball, no bar,
> Onward, whenever light winds blow,
> Fixed by no friendly star?

One might almost say that the good minute never actually occurs,—"Never the time and the place and the loved one all together"—but that existence sometimes throws out a hint as to what it might be like.

And yet, this aspiration must somehow, somewhere, be satisfied. Might there not be a better immortality than a mere continuation of earthly effort?

> How long such suspension may linger? Ah, Sweet—
> The moment eternal—just that and no more—
> When ecstasy's utmost we clutch at the core
> While cheeks burn, arms open, eyes shut and lips meet!
> ("Now")

As early as 1855, in "The Last Ride Together," he had begun to conceive of a heaven which would be an infinite prolongation of the good minute:

> What if we still ride on, we two,
> With life for ever old, yet new,
> Changed not in kind but in degree,
> The instant made eternity,—
> And heaven just prove that I and she
> Ride, ride together, forever ride?

This conception of heaven would be enhanced by the death of his wife:

> Then a light, then thy breast,
> O thou soul of my soul! I shall clasp thee again,
> And with God be the rest!
> ("Prospice")

Browning's notions of the after-life cannot be arranged in a neat chronological curve. The confusion which we have been examining runs from almost the beginning to the very end of his career. I believe, however, that a more detailed and academic treatment of the subject would show that this good-minute immortality becomes a favorite solace of the poet's old age. Thus, a lyrical interlude in "Ferishtah's Fancies" (1884) declares that if he had never known love's rapture,

> . . . how should I conceive
> What a heaven there may be? Let it but resemble
> Earth myself have known! No bliss that's finer, fuller,
> Only bliss that lasts, they say, and fain would I believe.

The same feeling is strong in Browning's last volume, *Asolando* (1889). These poems, however, also provide clear evidence that he has espoused the doctrine of chase and struggle too completely to be satisfied with an endless good minute. On earth, the special quality of the experience was inseparable from the vigorous quest of it, the almost but not quite getting it, the brave adventure of trying to get it again. Would not these values be lost if the consummation were eternally complete and unimperilled? Would not such a heaven prove as wearisome as Rephan's star, which this same volume condemns? In "Speculative," he says that, although "Others may need new life in Heaven,"

I shall pray: "Fugitive as precious—
Minutes which passed,—return, remain!
Let earth's old life once more enmesh us,
You with old pleasure, me—old pain,
So we but meet nor part again!"

He wants the good minute, but he wants it entangled in the hurly-burly of "earth's old life"—the pain as well as the pleasure of it.

But he cannot eat his cake and have it too. Heaven cannot simultaneously provide *both* the broken arcs and the perfect round. The Reaper is at the door, and he must make his final choice. In the "Epilogue" of *Asolando,* his farewell to mankind, he casts his vote for an eternity of struggle and strife. On earth he has been

One who never turned his back but marched breast forward,
Never doubted clouds would break,
Never dreamed, though right were worsted, wrong would triumph,
Held we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better,
Sleep to wake.

And this is precisely how he wishes to live in heaven. The friends whom he leaves behind must

Bid him forward, breast and back as either should be,
"Strive and thrive!" cry "Speed,—fight on, fare ever
There as here!"

That is our final glimpse of Robert Browning—eternally falling and rising, striving and thriving, speeding and fighting toward a goal which, if it were ever attained, would thereby lose its power to stimulate his appetite for adventure. He wished to think of heaven as a state in which the probationary struggle would be rewarded by the gift of "one fair good wise thing"; but he had committed himself so recklessly to mere energy-worship that at last he was impelled to project life's muddle beyond the gates of death. Of course, such a heaven would be the appropriate abode of a modernistic "limited" God who could strive and thrive along with man in one indiscriminate divine-human effort—"there as here." For me, however, the "Epilogue" to *Asolando* marks the outcome of a profound spiritual tragedy. Others must "Greet the unseen with a cheer."

COMMUNICATION

CRISIS THEOLOGY AND MARTIN BUBER

HAROLD SCHULWEIS

IN HIS COMPREHENSIVE EXPOSITION of the religious philosophy of Martin Buber (*Review of Religion,* November, 1948) Professor Blau indicates his profound influence upon contemporary "crisis theology," and elsewhere (*Jewish Social Studies,* October, 1948) informs us that the dean of European neo-reformation theology, Emil Brunner "is now expressing his thought in the language of the central religious insight of Buber." The point of similarity between Protestant crisis theology and Buber's theocentric personalism has, however, been popularly exaggerated. Both, it is true, are critical of rationalistic philosophy, which, it is held, takes little cognizance of the temporal and concrete nature of human existence; the impersonal character of scientific knowledge is said "to kill the future by regarding it as already fixed" (Brunner); and modern man, it is further agreed, has deified the work of his hands, forgotten his finite being, and turned to the arrogant idolatry of nation, science, and ideology. So much for their negative criticism. In their positive theological formulations, however, they clearly part company in regard to major religious issues.

Karl Heim's theology is a case in point. Particularly in his *God Transcendent,* he makes careful acknowledgment of his debt to Buber's postulated twofold primary relations ("I-Thou" and "I-It"), the crux of the latter's entire metaphysics. This acceptance of Buber's forms of relationship *(verhältnisse),* which Heim has assumedly incorporated into his concept of "dimensions," turns out on closer analysis to be a mere pun. Selecting the character of "otherness" in Buber's description of the "Thou," Heim ignores the "sameness" aspect of the "other" which, for Buber, is essential to the dialogic relation between man and God and man and man. Buber's cryptic ontological assumption of a universal structural unity in human consciousness *(strukturzusammenhang)* makes real the possibility of achieving this desired intuition and understanding of the "other." Buber, likewise, takes the *imagio dei* concept seriously, and it is God's sameness and nearness to man which allows for a reciprocal encounter with the Eternal Thou. To Buber, God is not the "Wholly Other" alone, but also "the Wholly Same, the

Wholly Present. Of course, he is the Mysterium Tremendum . . . but He is also the mystery of the self evident, nearer to me than my I."[1]

Heim's dichotomy of man's relationships with God and with man contradicts Buber's repeated attempts to bridge the gap. Thus, in opposition to Buber's holism, Heim writes: "I find myself much closer to a man who is anchored in the *beyond,* even if, to my hurt, he fights on the opposite side in a quarrel about *worldly* matters, than I can ever be to one who knows no such anchorage in the same line of battle."[2] Such a far reaching dualism between act and faith, between the "worldly" and the "beyond," merely testifies to the irrelevance of Heim's religious belief in the sphere of social and ethical action. Buber's I-Thou meeting with God is, contrarily, the source of man's decision and conscience on the intra-mundane level of human existence. God is revealed in the social act; the revelation and its consequent "pragmatic" manifestation are necessarily consistent and complementary. The breach between man and God is complete in Heim. The unknown God cannot be reached "either through forms of intuition or forms of thought." Buber's intuitional relation, which exists without speech "yet begets it" should be as objectionable to Heim as is Hegel's or Fichte's idealism, or Bergson's intuitionalism.

Buber's "I" does not stand before God as "unsubstantial nothingness" (Heim). Relinquishing the autonomy and uniqueness of the human "I," Buber insists, is the failure of the neo-mystic doctrine of "absorption." It is the static other-worldly solution to the real dualism of the world form, which destroys the mutual, reciprocal relation between man and the Eternal Thou. But Heim addresses God saying: "I have therefore given you authority to be the central point of the whole and to treat everything else, *myself included,* as *"not I."*[3] Heim's description of the man-God relationship is one in which "I resign the 'I' throne to you."[4] But, in our relation with a finite creature, Heim tells us, "there is a certain value in our giving him a *fragment* of our life." Here, again, the essence of Buber's I-Thou form demands that the dialogue "can only be spoken with the *Whole* being."[5]

1. *I and Thou,* p. 79.
2. *God Transcendent,* p. 26.
3. *Ibid.,* p. 159.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *I and Thou,* p. 9.

BUBER AND THE BARTHIANS

Similarly in the crucial matters of the conception of grace, sin, the role of the state, and the function of organized religion, Buber's Hasidic meliorism and mystic activism takes an opposite stand from the quietistic acquiescence of Barthian theology. Far from being a *deus absconditus,* Buber's Personal God, known through love, makes man his partner in shaping his destiny. With astonishing boldness God is made almost dependent on the man who says "Thy will be done," but truth adds for him "through me (man) whom Thou needst."[6] Man "turns the world into a sacrament" by bringing God into the very heart of community through his diurnal prosaic dealings with beings and things. Without mentioning the Barthians by name, Buber refers to the idea of an unapproachable God as "this demonic Thou to which no one can become Thou . . . , the elementary barrier of history where the basic word of connexion loses its reality."[7] Buber's God is both immanent and transcendent. The former attribute guarantees the communicability of prayer, the possibility of "conversation" with God. Barth's exaggerated transcendence of God is said to denude man of his *imagio dei* character; the same accusation, incidentally, which led to the interesting conflict between Brunner and Barth. The concept of divine immanentism, which has traditionally been accused of identifying good and evil with Reality, has prevented Buber from taking the solemn, morbid attitude towards sin of the Barthian writers. With characteristic Hasidic forbearance, the problem of man's natural sinfulness is glossed over. Evil itself is given a somewhat negative character of privation. Originally man is ethically ambivalent, and sin is nothing but indecision, "the aimless whirl of human potentialities."[8] Taken from the religious perspective, each being must be accepted as essentially good, and "only a part of a being can be hated." And this part, too, is merely misplaced or misdirected, and the opportunity for "reversal" or genuine repentance stares him constantly in the face. The "crisis" threat of hell or perdition is conspicuously absent for Buber's stumbling mortal caught in whirlpool of endless alternatives.

The matter of "grace" which occupies a central position in ecumenical literature concerns Buber but lightly. He counsels man to engage

6. *Ibid.,* pp. 82 f.
7. *Ibid.,* p. 68.
8. "The Question To The Single One," in *Between Man and Man,* p. 78.

himself "less about the other side, but about our side; not about grace, but about will."[9] This "will" is not in God's domain; for God's role is in His *response* to man's efforts and acts which are prior. The ground of "election" is, unlike Barthian dogma, not a one-sided affair, an indiscriminate "breaking-through-downwards from heaven" *(senkrecht von oben).* Buber's Eternal Thou, like that of Bergson's, "has nothing of the already made; he is unceasing life, action, freedom. Creation so conceived is not a mystery; we experience it ourselves when we act freely," (*Creative Evolution,* p. 271).

Buber's religious existentialism is involved in a this-worldly salvation. It does not extend beyond this life, nor does it wish "to expose what will be disclosed to us in its own time and disposition."[10] Vitally concerned with creative living, it clearly contradicts the crisis despair which appraises "the wood of this world unfit for the building of what is new."[11] Further, it denies the desperate justification of the socio-political status quo of a Barth and a Gogarten, which avers that "to understand means to have the insight of God that all this *must be* just as it is and not otherwise."[12]

Even more important is Buber's determined antinomianism, and his refusal to advocate parochial acceptance of any dogma. Drawing from his religious antecedence, he denys the existence of only one true universal religion. Revelation as such is not a single historic occurrence —fait accompli—, but a continual unceasing series of experienced events. All these pluralistic faiths and revelations need not preclude unity and understanding. Genuine interfaith does not require the abandonment of one's religious ideology. The identical content of faith, allegedly found in all religions, is of less significance to tolerant understanding than "the common situation of anguish and of expectation."[13] Requisite to inter-religious unity is the preservation of the unique "otherness" in the participants involved in the existential "conversation." "You (Christians) and we (Jews), each of us, it behooves to hold inviolably fast our own faith."[14]

If Pascal denies the God of the philosophers, Buber rejects the

9. *I and Thou,* p. 76.
10. *Ibid.,* p. 92.
11. *The Mediator,* p. 512.
12. *The Word of God and the Word of Man,* p. 320.
13. "Dialogue," in *Between Man and Man,* p. 8.
14. *Mamre,* p. 23.

logicized God of the theologians. Only those who have not met the Thou in the spontaneity, freedom, and exclusiveness of the I-Thou look for an institutionalized dogma, an object ("it") of devotion, a possessed form. Seeking to obey, to conform to ready made concepts, they are bound to fail in their search for God, who cannot be set up in time, space, or doctrine—but must be met in the living concrete moment. Buber's critical attitude towards ceremony, dogma, ritualistic formalism, and the like, follows in the tradition of German mysticism since 1300, particularly in the stern anti-dogmatism of Meister Eckhardt and Angelus Silesius, whom Buber devotedly studied. In contrast to Latin mysticism, the German brand had consistently taken a stand independent of church authority. In contrast to crisis theology, Buber's denunciations of the hardened obligatory creeds and rites of organized religion stand out clearly. Far from being either teacher or disciple of Protestant neo-orthodoxy, Buber remains its most severe critic.

Hermes, der Seelenführer. Das Mythologem vom männlichen Lebensursprung. By KARL KERÉNYI. (Albae Vigiliae, N. F., I.) Zürich: Rheinverlag, 1944, 111 pp.

This treatise by the well-known author of so many books on ancient, especially Greek, religion, opened a new sequence of the series *Albae Vigiliae* (White Nights), the first sequence of which was begun in 1939. Of the first sequence, nine volumes were written either by Mr. Kerényi alone (five volumes), who in the same period of years published in addition a number of comprehensive works elsewhere, or (four volumes) by Mr. Kerényi in collaboration with the famous Swiss psychologist, C. G. Jung. Since then, the second sequence has also made rapid progress. Again it consists mainly—the first several volumes exclusively—of contributions by Mr. Kerényi, and two of these contributions have already been discussed in *The Review of Religion* (XI, 159 ff.).

In the announcement of this second series, the author says that, in the years 1939 to 1941, when he was cut off from libraries, he concentrated on an attempt to find a new approach to the study of the ancient gods, an approach that would be equally well founded on the philological, the psychological, and the philosophical side. Above all he wishes to avoid what he calls the theological approach, which does not lead to a full realization of the greatness or sublimity *(Erhabenheit)* of the Greek gods, since those who use this approach try to cleanse the image of these gods from contradictions and from "Titanic" elements. He chooses instead a "truly mythological" approach, but does not describe this mythological approach any further than to state that it can never lead to a final solution, since mythology itself is something that has no beginning and no end. From its contrast to what the author calls the theological approach, however, it seems to follow that a scholar who follows the truly mythological approach will not try to eliminate contradictions in the character or attributes of the gods and, specifically, in regard to the Greek gods, will not separate the Olympic and the Titanic elements that may be found in one and the same god. That this is actually what the author means appears to be borne out by the method that he follows in the first book of the series, which deals with the god Hermes, especially, but by no means exclusively, in his quality as guide of souls to the other world.

The author starts from the beautiful and brilliant description of the character and nature of the Olympic Hermes which Walter F. Otto has given in his famous book *Die Götter Griechenlands.* What Otto tried to describe and characterize was the "Homeric" Hermes, and that aspect of the divine in the world which this Homeric Hermes represents or to which he is related. This does not mean that Otto took his illustrations of the nature of this Hermes exclusively from the Homeric poems. He picked them up everywhere, in Greek art, in the tragic poets, in folk tales, in records concerning the cult of Hermes in historical times, etc., wherever he could find something that seemed to him to agree with the essential character of the god as he stands out in Homer. At the same time, Otto was quite aware of the fact that in the Hermes of Homer one can discover some traits which must have come from an earlier and different religion. He believed, however, that these traits were so transformed that they fitted into the character of Hermes as he appeared in the "Homeric religion." He also tried to show that this Homeric Hermes had qualities which, at first sight, may appear opposite to one another; that, for instance, he may sometimes appear benevolent and helpful and then again harsh and cruel, and that, nevertheless, these seemingly opposite character traits were related to one another in such a way that they were, so to speak, natural complements in the same divine personality. It is this tendency to show the essential unity in the character of the "Homeric" Hermes which Kerényi considers "theological." Having chosen what he calls the "mythological" approach, he emphasizes in the remainder of his treatise the "Titantic" traits in the god Hermes.

Though, in the treatise under review, Kerényi does not define what he means by "Titanic," it is quite clear that what he has in mind is not the Titans of the *Titanomachia* or those gigantic figures like Atlas, Iapetos, Hyperion, etc., of which we think in the first place when we speak of the Titans. Even in Kerényi's account, Hermes is not at all Titanic in this sense. But, since in Greek mythology the Titans were the gods who ruled the world before Zeus and the Olympic gods came to power, he calls Titanic everything that essentially seems to belong to a pre-Olympic, pre-Homeric, and perhaps also largely pre-Greek religion.

In the first half of his treatise, then, which has the sub-title "Der Hermes der klassischen Überlieferung," the author first analyzes the

Hermes of the *Iliad,* the *Odyssey,* and the "Homeric" hymn on Hermes, in order to point out the "Titanic" elements found even in the Hermes of the Homeric epic and especially of the hymn. In a final chapter of this section, he discusses the relation of Hermes to night and darkness as illustrated by other passages in ancient literature and by representations of Hermes in Greek art.

The second half of the treatise, with the subtitle "Der Hermes des Lebens und des Todes," deals with the relations of Hermes with Eros, with female deities, mostly of a primeval character, the great Goddess, the "first" Artemis, etc., with the ram, and with Silenos. One chapter, however, discusses "the mystery of the Herme," i.e., those strange monuments which are at first round or mostly quadrangular pillars, then assume phallic form, and later are given a human head while the phallic attributes are moved to the middle of the pillar or are entirely omitted.

In the first section, the author certainly succeeds in showing the survival of some pre-Homeric traits in the Hermes of the Homeric epic, and especially of the so-called Homeric hymn to Hermes. But Otto was also aware of this factor, although he did not stress it very much and did not give a detailed analysis of it as the author has done. It would, moreover, seem that the Homeric hymn to Hermes, with its humor and playfulness, shows more than anything else how much these pre-Homeric traits were transformed so as to make them fit into the new idea of the Olympic gods. In the second section, the author uses his amazing knowledge of the most remote corners of ancient religion to bring together a great wealth of stories, or rather fragments of stories, to illustrate the Titanic features in the character of the god Hermes. For the ordinary reader—if I may consider myself an ordinary reader—it is rather difficult to find his way through the twilight of the primeval mythology which the author tries to reveal in these chapters, especially since, in this region, we find no documents that give a clear explanation of the various stories or religious practices belonging to it, but at best can only pick up a hint here and another hint there. But the author believes that this primeval mythology is of much more profound religious significance than the more intellectual religion of Homer or the classical Greeks. In dealing with this mythology, the author seems to follow the Delphic Apollo of Heraclitus, who οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει, or, to attempt a not very

adequate translation, "neither states anything nor conceals anything but points to something."

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Jesus, Jews and Gentiles. By BENJAMIN DANNIEL. New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1948. 239 pp. $3.00.

The Case of the Nazarene Reopened. By HYMAN E. GOLDIN. New York: Exposition Press, 1948. 863 pp. $5.00.

Christianity and the Children of Israel. By A. ROY ECKHARDT. New York: King's Crown Press, 1948. xiii, 223 pp. $3.00.

The oppression of Jews through the centuries and the attempt at their extermination in our own generation make a burning issue of Christendom's responsibility for both phenomena. The issue is invested with added urgency by the fact that the persecution, not infrequently, has been carried on not only by persons professing the Christian faith but in its name, and by the further circumstance that there are not wanting elements in the Christian tradition conducive to such an outcome.

Of the large and rapidly increasing bibliography on the subject, three items are now before us, one presumably of Jewish authorship, the other avowedly so, the third by a Christian theologian. To the two Jewish writers, the prime source of anti-Semitism would seem to be the New Testament narrative of the Crucifixion of Jesus by Jews who, if that narrative is to be credited, explicitly took upon themselves and their children the blood-guilt of their act. Both our authors, then, are bent on exonerating the Jews of this responsibility and, to this end, on refuting the traditional Christian account of Jesus' death.

But though there is a similarity in intent and, to some extent, in argumentation between the two books, resemblances let off with these points. Mr. Danniel's discussion is passionate, often bitter; it is, furthermore, the work of an autodidact who regards it as a virtue that he has confined his documentation to Scripture and has not "resorted to any outside sources, nor made use of any other knowledge." The logic behind this exclusiveness is clear. Mr. Danniel believes that Christians are more likely to be persuaded thereby. The end-product how-

ever is unscientific and, on occasion, attended by quite egregious errors.

The second volume of Jewish authorship comes from the hand of a rabbinic scholar who is, at the same time, a lawyer, and who has put both disciplines to good use. His purpose is nothing less than a re-examination of the crucifixion story in the light of modern juridical procedure and in accordance with its rules of evidence.

Rabbi Goldin's enterprise would appear at first glance a mere "stunt," but it turns out to be far more and better than that. Employing the accepted, courtroom methods of question and answer, examination and cross examination, he subjects the four Gospels to an analysis calculated to expose contradictions internal to each, their mutual inconsistencies, and their general dissonance from what is known of Jews, Judaism, and Jewish legal forms as they existed in the time of Jesus. The end product is a legal document of 568 pages, buttressed by another 170 pages of notes and bibliography. Temperate as a whole, despite its tendentiousness, and generally sound scientifically, it demonstrates impressively that whatever other authority the Gospels possess, they would be incapable of standing up as testimony in a contemporary court of law.

Nevertheless, Rabbi Goldin's argumentation, and the skill and effort he has put into it, would all appear to have been, in the end, to but little effect. Much of contemporary anti-Semitism is not Christian in inspiration, but pagan and nihilistic. Of that which is Christian, a substantial part is fundamentalist, whether Protestant or Catholic, and so closed against pleas such as this. Even non-fundamentalist Christians may find Rabbi Goldin's case irrevelant, their Christian faith, both in its desirable and undesirable elements, resting on premises other than the factual accuracy of Scripture.

Among others, Rabbi Goldin's argument would be beside the point for such a Christian as our third author. Dr. Eckardt, a neo-Reformationist in theology, might assent to Rabbi Goldin's contentions concerning the historicity in detail of the crucifixion story, without being in the least affected religiously, his faith resting less on the Scriptual word than on the *Tat-wort,* as Brunner calls it, the self-revelation of God in one unique, saving, and solely saving manifestation.

Neo-Reformationism seeks, on the one side, to avoid the dogmatism, bibliolatry, and preoccupation with doctrinal correctness of orthodox

Protestanism; on the other, it strives to avoid the complaisance of religious liberalism, which, equating faith with reasonableness, holds all religions seeking God and the ethical to be equally good. Against these positions, the latter especially, it insists on the uniqueness, supremacy, and plentitude of the revelation of God in Christ; on man's sinfulness as total, so that he can do nothing toward his own salvation; on his standing condemned, and all his institutions with him, under God's judgment; and on *sola gratia,* salvation entirely by divine grace.

With these principles as touchstones, Dr. Eckardt examines in turn the commonly accepted explanations of anti-Semitism, concluding, in the end, that none operating exclusively on the psychological, social, or economic level can altogether account for it. Only as an instance of rebelliousness against God, he contends, can the phenomenon be understood—a climatic instance, since it is a blow aimed less at Israel than at Christ who was of Israel according to the flesh.

This hypothesis laid, Dr. Eckardt next subjects the major schools of Christian thought, Absolutist, both Catholic and Protestant, Evangelical, Liberal, and his own Neo-Reformationist, to a searching scrutiny as to their attitudes, both in theory and practice, toward Jews and Judaism.

Christian Absolutism in all its forms, Dr. Eckardt concludes, though it may oppose anti-Semitism as a matter of conscious principle, is by nature pre-disposed toward it, the claim to final possession of any truth bringing, almost inevitably, in its wake an intolerance toward those who refuse to credit it.

Christian Liberalism, thanks to its affirmation of the equality of all advanced faiths, is spared the temptation to anti-Semitism; but, by very virtue of its tolerance, it will lack, according to Dr. Eckardt, the resolution required for the good fight.

Only neo-Reformation theology escapes the horns of this dilemma, and this though it stands with the Absolutists on issues of soteriology. Holding with them that there is no salvation except in Christ, it nonetheless avoids the anti-Judaism which normally flows from that doctrine. It achieves this because of other tenets. Thus, it maintains that Israel plays a necessary and never to be superseded role in the divine economy as the eternal protestant against the pagan gods of space, and as the dialectical voice antiphonal to the Church. Whence it follows

that the Christian mission, though directed to all the families of the earth, is not addressed to Israel. And if one ask how Christianity can be indispensable to all men—a point central to neo-Reformationism—and yet unnecessary to the Jews, Dr. Eckardt suggests that Israel is to be viewed as constituting a part of the Church latent, which worships "the hidden Christ," though unawares.

But the capacity of neo-Reformationism to resist the anti-Semitic tropism of traditional Christianity derives, in the main, from a thesis peculiar to itself among the branches of Christendom, the conception of all men and institutions as standing eternally condemned by the judgment of God. To this rule the Church is no exception, nor is any human formulation of religious truth, not even that of neo-Reformationism. But if so, then the superiority of the Christian over the Jew, while something in itself, disappears in the shadow of the sinfulness of both. Himself fallible and sinful, the Christian under this doctrine is stripped of that self-righteousness which serves among Christians unaware of their lack of justification as cause and sanction for Christian anti-Semitism. So neo-Reformationism, affirming a doctrine which normally issues in anti-Judaism, yet succeeds in inhibiting that consequence.

It is an impressive argument which Dr. Eckardt presents, impressive in the first instance as a review of the various Christian attitudes, manifest and latent, toward the Jews and Judaism, again, as a lucid, forceful exposition of neo-Reformation theology, still again, as a bold application of that theology to an old, painful problem, but, most impressive of all, as an example of what religious speculation can and ought to be. For this book is careful and sober, earnest and responsible, benevolent and pious, and, beyond all else, honest in its wrestling against all evil powers, including whatever in the author's faith may abet them.

And yet, for all its virtues, it is not without grave limitations. Thus it suffers from that imbalance common to all systems of thought stemming from the classic theologies of the Reformation and true to their spirit—an emphasis on human sinfulness and powerlessness so heavy as to obscure human goodness and capacity. Dr. Eckardt most certainly would side with Brunner against Barth on the issue whether the divine image has been expunged from man by sin. Yet even Brunner denied that man can effect anything toward his own salvation. This is the

basic position of the Reformation; it remains the general position of neo-Reformationism as well. If, then, the religious world is indebted to neo-Reformation thinkers for their rediscovery of the depth and tenacity of evil in man's nature and in the scheme of things, that same religious world has less reason to be grateful either to Calvin and Luther, or to their disciples in our own time who deny not only Pelagianism but Synergism also, that more temperate instruction of Melanchthon to the effect that man's efforts may, at the least, contribute to his own redemption. For to repudiate this possibility is to leave man spiritually impotent and, in turn, to make God arbitrary, since, if all men are equally devoid of merit and none deserves salvation more than another, the salvation of any is without moral warrant.

All in all, this reviewer, considering this latest instance of the neo-Reformation treatment of man's sinfulness, is left more admiring than ever of the ancient rabbinic intuition which discerned in man neither total depravity nor total virtue, but a polarity between the *yezer tov* and *yezer ra'*, the evil impulse and the good, and which further, without denying his need for divine grace, still affirmed man's independent moral powers, setting him up, despite all his moral frailties, as one who can be, if he so elects, a co-worker with God.

Now this is a criticism which pertains to Dr. Eckardt's position by inference, being imputed to him less because of any explicit assertion on his part than because of the general orientation of the school to which he adheres. But there are other criticisms that touch him more directly and personally. Thus, his neo-Reformationism and his undeniable devotion to universal mankind make uneasy bed companions. The former insists on salvation through Christ alone; it demands the mission, therefore, to all mankind, the Jews included. Dr. Eckardt, however, does not want to believe, he does not in fact believe, that decent human beings can be damned for failing to profess some particular creed. What is more, he genuinely respects earnestly religious Jews and obviously regards it as an act of supererogation for Christians to proselytize among them. Torn between his own universalism and the exclusiveness of his doctrine, he has the courage to stand by the former. He refuses to consign good Jews to damnation, nor will he undertake to convert them.

His only mistake, in this reviewer's judgment, is that he does not recognize or will not admit that this decision represents a breach with

the Christian past. Insisting on its traditional character and seeking to document the contention, he is driven to strained argumentation (witness the suggestion that Israel may not require the Christ on the ground that it may have accepted him all unawares) and to a forced documentation consisting of whatever fragments of support he could find for his case among older neo-Reformation thinkers. He would have done better, it would seem, had he been as canny and forthright on this issue as on so much else.

Finally, Dr. Eckardt is less than fair to religious Liberalism. Thus, it is not at all certain, as he assumes, that it was mainly the Orthodox and neo-Orthodox who stood up to Hitler in Europe. Where are his statistics as to the theological adherence of those who out of religious conviction ended up in concentration camps? Again, he underestimates religious Liberalism by understating it. To him it is necessarily spineless, since it lacks that certitude which only revelation can lend. But the religious liberal is bound by his liberalism to deny, not revelation, but the exclusive possession of it. Such a Liberalism may well possess not only the firmness of Orthodoxy but an even higher measure of it, since the truth affirmed is attested now not by one but my many witnesses.

Last of all, does not the religious Liberal, as a matter of practicality, proceed more sensibly than Dr. Eckardt in dealing with anti-Semitism? The latter posits the neo-Reformation postulate of the unique self-disclosure of God in Christ. Having thus set in motion a process which, as he admits, almost inevitably casts an anti-Semitic precipitate, he next busies himself to neutralize it. Does not the religious Liberal do better in never creating the problem to begin with?

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The Future of the American Jew. By MORECAI M. KAPLAN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. xx, 571 pp. $6.00.

After reading this careful analysis of the predicament of the modern Jew, I was startled to note that it is the predicament of modern man magnified several times. The Jew suffers the same difficulties of our time as the rest of us, but more acutely, and so exposes the nature of these difficulties as under a magnifying glass. Hence Rabbi Kaplan's

study of the American Jew is not only instructive concerning the Jew but illumines the problem of life for us all. His proposals for curing the ill are applicable to modern man as well as to the Jew.

According to Kaplan's analysis, the difficulties encountered by the American Jew arise from emancipation, nationalism, and naturalism. We think he should have added one other factor, namely, the overwhelming domination over our lives of economic production and consumption. This last is sometimes inaccurately called capitalism, but that is incorrect, since most forms of proposed socialism reveal the same distortion of human concern.

The Jew was emancipated from the ghetto in the latter part of the eighteenth century, at the time when the Age of Enlightenment was announcing a new and glorious world of freedom and abundance to be achieved by casting off the limitations of the Middle Ages. This emancipation of the Jew was more sudden and radical than it was for the rest of us, but something of the sort happened for all Europeans. The non-Jews did not emerge from ghettos, but they cast off forms of thought and action, belief and apprehension, which had previously held them within a unity and order of life and a compactness of community. This order from which we all were liberated was, for the Jew, more restricted, the change for him was much more sudden, and the contrast between the old world and the new was much more radical.

After the enthusiasm of the first beginning, however, the new freedom was found to have its own evils. The first of these was loss of orientation. This can be expressed by formulating the questions which found no answer in the new freedom. What is supremely important, for which we all should live above all else? What is better and worse, not only for me but for all? Where do I belong? What and where is the community that needs me, and will sustain me? What is my heritage and my hope in the whole movement of history? Does the life of man throughout history have a direction? Is it going somewhere? Prior to the emancipation, these questions had an answer, and the answers were accepted with conviction. After the emancipation, the questions were not answered in any satisfactory manner. For many there was no answer except the void.

The second evil that confronted us all after the emancipation, but hurt the Jew much more than the rest of us, was nationalism. Nationalism, says Kaplan, is not an evil but a good, when it consists of a so-

cial unit which protects and fosters the life of its members and provides not only for individuals but also for distinct groups to live in fruitful association with one another. But nationalism becomes an evil when it claims to exercise supreme power and authority over its individual members and demands from them an obedience and a devotion which would be justified only if the nation were truly the source of all good for human beings.

This evil kind of nationalism afflicts the Jew more than any other, because his unique history sets him apart. He cannot simply melt into the mass under the domination of the state, even when he wants to do so, because the rest of the mass thinks of him as different. Also, he himself, in most cases, cannot expunge from his subconscious self the consequence of long centuries in which the Jew gave supreme devotion and obedience to a community and a God that stood over and above the political order in which he lived. Hence, when the state demanded the merging of all loyalties into the unity of its own life, the Jew became a marked man. He stood out like a sore thumb. The harder the state strove for unquestioning solidarity, the more hostile it became toward the Jew. The psychological consequence of all this for the Jew was the feeling of being lost and alien, unwanted and outcast. In extreme cases this resulted in self-hate imposed by himself and anti-Semitism imposed by the society in which he lived.

The third evil consequence of emancipation was naturalism. Here again, Kaplan distinguishes between good and bad. Naturalism is good when it seeks, within the bounds of time and space, to find what is supremely important for all human living and to test its findings by the most reliable methods for distinguishing between truth and error. Also, naturalism is good when it devises the best means for serving what has been found to be most important. But naturalism becomes evil when it assumes the form of what Kaplan calls "scientism." By this he means the denial of all reality to anything which lies beyond the reach of the several natural sciences. Naturalism in this form can have all degrees of rigor in excluding those realities and concerns which make life supremely worthful. In some of its forms it rejects all religious and ethical considerations as rationalizations and illusions.

While we all suffer from this kind of naturalism, the Jew suffers most, because for centuries he has been sustained by a civilization that was most passionately devoted to a religion and morality supernatu-

rally interpreted. While the individual Jew may cast off this supernaturalism completely, it leaves him without any religion and unable to recover one, because, in his heritage, religion has been so completely identified with the supernatural.

Religion and morality are not necessarily supernaturalistic. According to Kaplan, they can be and ought to be naturalistic. But he also notes that Jews seem less able than others to conduct effective religious inquiry within the bounds of naturalism. At first this seems surprising, since, throughout their history, Jews have been pre-eminent in religious and moral search and concern. But the reason for it we have already noted: the change from the supernaturalism of the ghetto to the naturalism of the modern world has been too sudden and too radical. In time the Jew may recover his balance and again take leadership in this supremely important field. Indeed, Kaplan himself has taken such leadership and is openly naturalistic in his outlook. But most Jews either repudiate all religion or else cling to a supernaturalism that finds no place in the new understanding of the world.

After this diagnosis of the Jew's predicament, Kaplan goes on to suggest what should be done about it. He says that the Jew must do six things if he is to overcome the difficulties and dangers that beset him. First of all, he must learn to live in two civilizations, that of the Gentile world, namely, America, and that of the Jewish world, which is distinctively a religious civilization.

He must organize the Jewish community and direct all the agencies which are distinctively Jewish so as to conserve what is good out of the ancient heritage and create a Jewish way of life that will hang together. Thus will he form a community that can sustain him personally and serve as an agency to give powerful aid to the modern world as a whole in solving its problems. The Jews are not the chosen people, says Kaplan, but they, like any people with a great tradition, have a service to render and a vocation to follow that can help modern man to pass through the crisis of our times. Kaplan is not only concerned with the Jew but also with the modern world. These two (the Jew and the new age) can help one another immensely or hurt one another disastrously. Kaplan's book is an attempt to show how the first result can be attained and the second avoided.

A Jewish homeland in Palestine is a further requirement. Without it the Jews cannot survive as a people in the world as it is today. Al-

ready serious disintegration of their peoplehood has begun, says the author. The disappearance of this people and all that they might contribute can be prevented only if there is a land where a Jewish community is struggling to create a home for itself, thus providing a government and a land which all Jews over the world can claim as their own and serve and honor in song and story and material aid; which can be the source and symbol of their life as a people, the theme and center of Jewish art and literature, Jewish law and religion. The Diaspora can save this homeland of Jewry, and the homeland can save the Diaspora; but they are indispensable to one another.

Jews throughout the world must fight for democracy, says Kaplan. They will suffer more than any others if democracy fails, because only democracy, especially ethnic democracy, will permit them to exist. Their ancient way of life has in it some of the most important ingredients and aspirations of democracy. Not because of any peculiar innate virtue, but because of their exposed position, the compulsions of survival, and the faith and code by which they have lived in the past, they can be (and to save themselves must be) the defenders and creators of a democratic way of life.

The Jews must concentrate their peculiar resources upon the problems of religious faith and moral conduct. This is their distinctive vocation, partly because of the limitations imposed upon them in their capacity as Jews, since they must be Americans and not Jews in their political and economic activities. This is their vocation, furthermore, because the accumulated resources of their history gathered through three thousand years have been developed and fitted and applied to moral and religious problems. It is true, says Kaplan, that the Jews have been more inept than others in recent years in trying to develop an interpretation of God and salvation that will meet the need of our time, but this was explained above. If rightly treated this state of affairs may be transitional to a recovery of the ancient religious and moral vocation of the Jew.

Finally, all these efforts by which the Jews might save themselves and render a service to humanity in our time must be capped by an education fitted to propagate and enrich the Jewish Peoplehood. Education as conducted in America today has no ruling purpose accepted by all educators. The Jews must have an educational system for themselves that is directed by a purpose, and must help general education

to recover a ruling directive. Kaplan pictures a university of Judaism that might be the head and ruling center of the entire Jewish educational system.

This, in brief, is the diagnosis of the Jewish malady and the proposals for its cure, as set forth by Kaplan. It is, we repeat, also the diagnosis and proposed cure of modern man generally. The reviewer is in accord with this analysis and the constructive suggestions. Also, with the author, he believes that a reinterpreted religion and a reorganized education are of prime importance, not only for the salvation of the Jew but for the salvation of all of us. Since these two are so important, the reviewer is impelled to criticize Kaplan's treatment of religion and education. He agrees with much that the author says and will mention only the points of disagreement.

To the mind of the reviewer, in treating religion, Kaplan has fallen into the trap that has caught religious liberalism generally when it tried to escape from traditional supernaturalism. Some, finding themselves in a trap, made another leap and landed in a second trap called neo-orthodoxy. Kaplan has not made the second leap, and we hope he never will. We only mention the second to get the entire religious situation before us with its three prevailing forms of religious thought, namely, traditional supernaturalism, religious liberalism, and neo-orthodoxy (called by another name if desired).

The trap into which religious liberalism has fallen, according to the reviewer, can be called subjectivism. The claim to go beyond reason and empirical evidence, made by the neo-orthodox, is no better than this subjectivism, but the two should not be confused. The following statements made by Kaplan reveal the feature of religious liberalism that is criticized here:

> All we know about God is what happens to human life when men believe in God, and how much improvement in their mode of life and thought is reflected in their belief concerning God (p. 181).
> We . . . need to believe that God is omnipotent. Belief in God must mean for us . . . that nothing is too difficult for God, that whatever ought to be can and will be (p. 202).
> . . . belief in God . . . would enable us to transcend suffering and the fear of death, overcome weakness and temptation. . . . (p. 203).
> What we need is to ascertain what guiding principles and thoughts we can find in our religious tradition that are compatible with our modern concept

of salvation, and that might serve as an incentive to strive for that salvation (p. 245).

These quotations show that religious belief, for Kaplan and other religious liberals, is shaped and sought and cherished for its psychological consequences. All we can know about God is what results in our lives when we believe certain things concerning God. While religious liberals do not so intend, this makes religious belief merely a device by which conduct is controlled by auto-suggestion and alter-suggestion. Outside religion, beliefs that command respect specify some state of affairs and are valued, not because they inspire but because they give us information about some reality which calls for action. Without such information we cannot act intelligently to meet the demands and avoid the dangers. In short, beliefs are rightly valued only as sources of information. But in the quotations given, belief is valued not because it informs but because it inspires. According to the first quotation above, we cannot really know anything about God. All we can know are the consequences resulting from holding certain beliefs about God. This reduces religion to helpful illusions and the tricks of psychology.

Rabbi Kaplan and other religious liberals do not intend to treat religion in this way; but this is the outcome of what they are saying when they speak as they almost always do about "religion" doing us so much good, instead of specifying the nature of a known reality which operates (independently of our beliefs) in such a way that, if we get the required information about it and act accordingly, it will save us. When the "God-idea" is held to be the saving power instead of an actual reality which exists regardless of our ideas, religion bogs down in the mire of subjectivism. A case in point is Kaplan's claim that we must believe God to be omnipotent, because if we do not, the belief will not inspire us or keep up our courage. But surely the ground for any belief about God, like anything else, must be evidence other than the helpful psychological consequences of the belief.

What Kaplan says here is not peculiar to himself. He is in the midstream of the great current of religious liberalism. We have picked out these few rare statements from his book, not because they are representative of him and the book; for the most part he keeps clear of this psychological trap. But the evil is so widespread and deep laid in

present-day religious thought that it seemed necessary to set it forth when found in a work otherwise rigorously realistic.

One other feature of religious liberalism, strongly opposed by the reviewer, must be mentioned because it occurs in this book. Kaplan identifies God with the cosmic whole of things. On page 182, he writes: ". . . the cosmos as a whole is so constituted as to make for man's salvation. . . . To view the cosmos in this way is to believe in God." He recognizes that, when this position is taken, all the enormity of evil in the cosmos becomes a serious problem. But he does not solve the problem and continues to identify belief in God with belief in a cosmos so constituted as to make for man's salvation. This puts the religious liberal in a predicament. He is forced to defend his belief in the goodness of the universe against all the facts of evil. This almost inevitably produces an unrealism, a focussing on the good and a turning away from the evil, and hence a false optimism based on a covering over, or turning away from, the facts of evil. But even that is not the worst result of taking this position. When we look to the constitution of the universe as a whole to find the power and guidance of God, we can find nothing at all, because the universe as a whole does not distinguish anything from anything else. The cosmos is everything, therefore it does not distinguish one thing from another. The indiscriminate totality is the same as nothing, so far as concerns guidance away from this and toward that, or help for this and against that. The constitution of the cosmos cannot be away from anything or toward anything; it cannot be for this or against that, because it includes them all indiscriminately and without favor. This seems to me to knock the props completely from any religion, except as it may provide a belief about the goodness of the universe which inspires with false courage and ungrounded hope.

In this criticism of religious liberalism, we are not advocating neo-orthodoxy or traditional supernaturalism. We believe each of these is as bad as the other. In short, religious thought today is in a sorry mess due to the conditions so well described by Kaplan in this book. We are with him in most of what he says, but on that very account must distinguish sharply where we cannot follow him.

The book as a total undertaking in the wide sweep of its endeavor is searching and highly competent. It analyzes the need of the Jew and of us all, and makes important suggestions on how the Jew might be

saved in such a way as to do magnificent work in helping to save the world. Kaplan criticizes his fellow Jews severely and is keenly aware of their weaknesses and failures, but we believe he rightly sees for the Jew a noble destiny if the necessary conditions are met. Also, we believe that, for the most part, he correctly discerns these conditions and what must be done to meet them.

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Three Saints' Lives. By NICHOLAS BOZON. Edited and translated by SISTER M. AMELIA (KLENKE), O.P. St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1947. lxxviii, 123 pp.

The traditional friendship and co-operation between the Dominican and Franciscan Orders is once more evidenced in the present edition of Friar Nicholas Bozon's lives of Saints Mary Madeleine, Margaret, and Martha. Although these have been recently edited by Miss Mary Learned in the *Franciscan Studies,* XXV (1944), the present edition has not only the advantage of being more readily accessible, but it has also been provided with a helpful English translation printed beside the original Anglo-French text, with corresponding passages from Jacobus de Voragine's *Golden Legend* at the foot of the pages, as well as with punctuation and helpful literary, historical, and linguistic studies and notes.

The texts themselves are so closely dependent on the *Golden Legend* that they must be considered as little more than loose translations of the corresponding passages of Jacobus de Voragine. This fact, which is evident from a comparison of the two texts, would seem to invalidate some of the editor's speculations in the introductory chapter, entitled "Sources and Date of Composition of the Poems as determined by Bozon's Use of the Provençal Legends." Bozon, it is clear, did not himself use those legends directly, but only through Voragine. The "poems" then are not "composed" at all, but simply adapted from the latter, and questions of origins and literary history should properly refer to his work and not to Bozon's. Friar Nicholas' lack of intimate personal familiarity with the Provençal legends about the coming of Mary Magdalen, Martha, Lazarus, and Maximinus to the South of France is shown by his failure to mention any of the many localities

connected with these legends in their local Provençal or French form. He speaks of Aix as "Aquense" (*Vie de S. Marie Madeleine,* l. 409) and of Vézelay as "Ciliacense" (*Ibid.,* l. 439), obviously reproducing the Latin forms he found in his model, as if he never associated them with the well known French localities.

Sister Amelia seeks to establish 1281 as a probable *terminus a quo,* since that was the date of the Vézelay "triumph" when Pope Martin IV authenticated its claims to possession of the relics of the Magdalen. This is, of course, pure conjecture: a poem in honor of the Saint might have been written at any time in the Middle Ages, and this particular one, with its reference to Vézelay, borrowed from the *Legenda Aurea,* could have been written at any time after the publication of the latter, generally placed about 1270. The proposed *terminus ad quem* of 1295, date of the "explosion" of Vézelay's claims by Boniface VIII's final decision in favor of the claims of St. Maximin as against those of Vézelay, would seem more solidly established. In fact, the prestige and prosperity of the great Burgundian Abbey declined very rapidly thereafter, so that the huge Romanesque church on top of its hill in the rolling countryside no doubt soon looked as cavernously empty and forsaken as it does today. Nonetheless, we must not forget that Bozon simply copies these lives of the saints from his source, and he may not have been at all concerned with the claims and counter-claims of French religious houses. Indeed, if he were so concerned, we might see therein a particular reason why he might have written this particular Life of the Magdalen precisely *after* 1295, when the prestige of Vézelay was dealt a mortal blow by Boniface's decision. Although Sister Amelia appears to have overlooked the possibility, Friar Nicholas may have had his own reasons for bolstering up the failing prestige of the shrine at Vézelay. For it was there that, in 1217, the seven friars sent to France by St. Francis founded the first Franciscan community in that country.

Pure conjecture, also, is the interesting suggestion that Friar Nicholas may have been inspired to "translate the *Golden Legend* into verse after a chance meeting with its renowned author" (p. L), at the General Chapters of the Dominican Order held in Paris and at Oxford in 1279 and 1280. We have no evidence that Voragine was present at either of these Chapters General. Sister Amelia points out that he was

provincial prior of his Order from 1267 to 1277 and from 1281 to 1286, but precisely at the time the Chapters General were held in Paris and Oxford, he was not in office. It is, therefore, perhaps excessive to stay with Richardson (*Materials for a Life of Jacopo da Varagine,* New York, 1935, p. 25. quoted by Sister Amelia, p. L) that "it almost needs evidence to the contrary to show that he did not attend." And there is no evidence at all that Bozon was in Paris or Oxford at that time. However, Sister does show that it is likely that he studied at Oxford, and it may well have been at about 1280, although we know nothing of the chronology of his life.

The editor's chapter headed "Nicholas Bozon" (pp. xxiv-xxxiv) is a reprint of her valuable contribution to our knowledge of her author, originally published in *Speculum,* XV (1944). The following chapter on the "Works of Bozon" is a very useful listing of all the works attributed to him, their manuscripts and editions. The next chapter on the "Sources and date . . ." referred to above, is perhaps over-dependent on the article "Lazarus" by Dom Leclercq, in the *Dictionnaire d'Archéologie Chrétienne et de Liturgie,* and is somewhat lacking in precision. There is, for example, mention (p. xlii) without further identification except by reference to the highly unreliable Faillon, of the "oldest document pertaining to the Vézelay cult," and to "the ancient *Acts* of the Magdalene" without any further reference or dating at all.

The editorial work proper, transcription of the manuscript, resolution of the abbreviations, punctuation, etc., is competently and carefully performed. The English translation, however, on which many readers may have to rely, at times leaves something to be desired in accuracy. The text tells us, for instance, that the Magdalen was so called after Magdala "la sue cité, Dune dame fut par heritage," which means that she was its (liege) lady by inheritance, and not, as the translation reads, "Of which she was a lady by birth (line 11)." Some lines later (l. 52), when we read that "Jhesu . . . l'ad issi areysoné," the meaning is not "Jesus . . . Reasoned with him thus," but simply *Jesus . . . addressed (spoke to) him thus.* The expression "trop de richesce" (l. 163) means simply *much wealth,* not "too much wealth"; "les sustindrent en mester" (l. 193) does not mean "sustained them in their work," but *assisted them in their need,* as the Latin text at the

foot of the page shows: "iis necessaria ministraverunt." "Resone" (l. 197) means *speech,* not "reasoning"; "Ne vus dotez de nule rien" (l. 256) means *Fear nothing,* not "Do not doubt anything"; "Par la vertu Jhesu Crist" (*Vie S. Margaret,* l. 208) means *By the power of Jesus Christ,* not "Through the virtue (merits) of Jesus Christ." When Jesus appeared to Bishop Fronto of Périgueux and miraculously transported him to the distant house where Martha lay dead, the text tells us that "meintenant le eveske fut A cele meson ou Martha geut," meaning that *the Bishop immediately went to the house where Martha lay,* not "now the bishop was at that house where Martha lay"; this familiar use of the past tenses of the verb *être* in the sense of *to proceed, to go,* is found in the French language from the Middle Ages until the present day, as in Pascal's first *Provincial Letter:* "Je fus retrouver mon Janséniste."

Since Bozon's text is a mere paraphrase of Jacobus de Voragine's, the really interesting literary study would have been an analysis of the precise fashion in which he used his Latin model, the parts he omitted, his method of translation and adaptation, his errors and his alterations and additions. This study would, I think, have been richly rewarding and singularly revealing, for it would have pointed out and examined the differences in mentality between the Dominican Archbishop of Genoa writing in Latin for clerics and the English Franciscan friar writing in Anglo-French for a popular lay audience. In the first place, there is some garbling of the Latin. Jacobus tells us, for example, that the pearl *(margarita)* is said to have power against the effusion of blood, and "Sic beata Margareta habuit virtutem contra effusionem sui sanguinis per constantiam, qui in suo martirio constantissima exstitit (p. 30)." This appears strangely in the French as "Le sanc estanchea de parenté Kant fit encuntre lur volenté"—*She stanched the blood of (her) lineage, when (since) she went counter to their will* (*Vie S. Margaret,* ll. 21-22). But even more interesting and meaningful are the omissions of proper names, dates, authorities, and of the precise and correct theological wording of the Latin, in favor of the vague, unsupported, simplified and uncritical writing of the vernacular. In the same passage alluded to above, Jacobus writes of St. Margaret "Cujus legendam Theotimus vir eruditissimus scripsit." Friar Nicholas rightly thought that the name of Theotimus would mean nothing to his lay public, but in relating the Saint's martyrdom he trys to appeal to his

readers' (or hearers') hearts and consciences by reminding them, in a personal addition, that

Kan une femme tendre e frele	When (Since) a delicate and frail woman
Tels mals suffrit sanz querele,	Suffered such evils (pain) without complaint,
Ceo nus deit bien conforter	That should greatly encourage us
En grevance confort aver.	To take . . . comfort in affliction.

Again, when St. Margaret in prison prays God to show her her enemy openly, Jacobus tells us that "ecce draco immanissimus apparuit." This was evidently a little too pale and matter-of-fact for Friar Nicholas, who wished to impress upon his public that this demon-dragon was "An extremely hideous and fierce dragon." And then he further added that "From his mouth issued such fire That there where formerly there was no light, Every corner of the house [was lighted]." The dragon, according to both Voragine and Bozon, then opened his mouth and swallowed the Saint, "But by the [sign of] the Cross the dragon burst asunder," and Margaret was delivered safe and unharmed. Voragine, however, had previously told us that she had made the Sign of the Cross at the first appearance of the dragon "et ille evanuit, vel, ut alibi legitur . . . ," and then he tells the tale of the swallowing and bursting. Unlike Friar Nicholas, though, Archbishop Jacobus finds the tale harder to swallow than the dragon did the Saint, for he hastens to add: "Istud autem, quod dicitur de draconis devoratione et ipsius crepatione, apocryphum et frivolum reputatur." Needless to say, Friar Nicholas refused to spoil his effect by translating this dash of archiepiscopal cold water on his tale.

These are only a very few and elementary samples of the interesting confrontations that might be made. Many of them would go much deeper and tell us more about the highly interesting modes of religious thinking and feeling in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. It is to be hoped that Sister Amelia, who has served us so well in this edition, will continue her work and publish or republish the other saints' lives by Bozon and furnish us with the valuable literary and religious analysis these texts suggest.

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Nicolaus of Autrecourt: A Study in 14th Century Thought. By Julius Rudolph Weinberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press for the University of Cincinnati, 1948. x, 242 pp. $3.75.

This is an interesting historical study of a philosopher whose doctrines were condemned by the Papal Court. His thought can, accordingly, be treated as both symptom and cause of medieval ferments. The book also exploits Nicholas in defense of a philosophical position which, in the opinion of that author and his present commentator, refutes Aristotelian philosophy, an "error" which dies hard. In this use of medieval ideas for current ends, Dr. Weinberg's essay is an example of a type, especially common among the Poles, in which empiricists interested in formal logic have discovered congenial spirits and useful materials in the fourteenth century. That this century was despised for its logic-chopping by the founders of the "modern" tradition is both an indication of the character of recent thought and an example of mutability in historical judgments.

Strict historians will commend the author's erudition, but will probably question the attribution of certain doctrines to Nicholas and Aristotle: in the former case, because he has frankly gone beyond the text where necessary to construct a cogent argument; in the latter, because the meaning of Aristotle's views is assumed, apparently as being in the public domain, without much reference to texts. Philosophers, less concerned with who said what than in the dialectical significance of what was or might have been said, will admire the acuteness of the argument, but will wonder about the meaning of the theses established or refuted.

Dr. Weinberg's critical and philosophical commitments are simply stated:

> The claims that Aristotelian philosophy made for natural knowledge were subjected to annihilating criticism in the fourteenth century by Nicolaus of Autrecourt, and in the eighteenth century by David Hume. Apologists can make a specious case against Hume by urging that his climate of opinion and his temperament rendered him incapable of a correct understanding of Aristotle. It is impossible to make a similar case against Nicolaus of Autrecourt, who, we may be sure, lived in a period of intellectual history that was steeped in Aristotelian conceptions and procedures.

Only if we realize that Aristotle was successfully refuted in the scholastic period itself, says Dr. Weinberg, "can we judge the rather extrava-

gant claims currently urged in behalf of a return to Aristotelian modes of thought" (p. 3).

A "successful refutation" surely ought to stick, and we shall be grateful for such a rarity, if genuine, but the foregoing remarks seem naïve. Let us agree upon the difficulty of showing that Nicholas (or anyone) was "incapable" of a "correct understanding of Aristotle" (or of any philosopher) by reason of his temperament or climate of opinion. (One might argue that a philosopher *did* not understand another, using one's best judgment of their writings.) It seems equally implausible to reverse the argument by suggesting that, since Nicholas lived in a period "steeped" in Aristotelian lore, he must have understood the Aristotelian commonplaces, in which all philosophers expressed themselves, in a manner consistent with the Aristotelian philosophy. Dr. Weinberg shows that he is well acquainted with the disagreements of the fourteenth century. He knows that nearly every writer quoted The Philosopher for support. It should, then, have been evident that, for all their steeping, some of the contenders must have misunderstood Aristotle. Of course Nicholas may have understood him very well, but that is a question of detailed interpretation rather than of cultural osmosis.

Here we have a major failure in the polemical intentions of the book. The name of Aristotle shares the spotlight, if not the honors, with Nicholas; but the historical Aristotle is not examined in reference to the main points at issue. Only two passages contain much more than allusions to his doctrines. And in both, concerning the "substance-accident ontology" as a presupposition of Aristotle's defense of the principle of non-contradiction (pp. 13 f., 29) and concerning the meaning of probability (pp. 117-19, 121), the reading is highly dubious.

This casualness about the Aristotle who is refuted can be justified if, as is assumed, Nicholas' critique demolishes a whole family of doctrines among which any of the many Aristotelianisms, as well as other philosophies, will be found (pp. 99 f.). The family is variously characterized as holding that the existence of substances and causes can be "strictly demonstrated" (p. 7), that "a philosophy" can be demonstrated or that "a demonstrative metaphysics and epistemology" are possible (p. 8), that we can have evident knowledge, in Nicholas' sense of "evident," of the existence of substances and causes (p. 99), or more

comprehensively, as "any attempt to pass deductively from experience or from principles to transempirical facts" (p. 100).

The trouble with this is that the Aristotle with whom this reviewer is acquainted would agree in rejecting all or most of these opinions. Unless "demonstration" is watered down to include dialectical arguments which test and defend, but do not by themselves establish, philosophic principles, he ascribes credence in the first two to a want of education. He would reject the third for reasons to be mentioned in connection with the meaning of "evident." The author of the *Posterior Analytics* would not attempt "to pass deductively from experience" to anything unless "experience" is so broadened that it comprises νους, the product of inductions from a more literally conceived experience. He does proceed from "principles," by definition and etymology, but the clarification of what a principle is, and how one is identified, is both a complicated business and probably the key to the whole issue. This is sloppy work for one who makes so much of logical rigor.

What Nicholas and Professor Weinberg established by their subtle discussions is a variant of the unquestionable thesis that "pure logic cannot find necessary connections between the known and the unknown" (p. 36). The evidently known is completely classified as (1) the immediate objects of the five senses, (2) acts which we experience in ourselves, and (3) propositions known *ex terminis* by reduction to the principle of non-contradiction (pp. 22, 41). Since substances, being distinct from sensible qualities, are not immediate data, one can not infer their existence (p. 37). For in a necessary implication, whose denial is a contradiction, the content of the consequent must be "really identical" with something signified by the antecedent (p. 31). For similar reasons, evident knowledge of causes is denied and replaced by perceived co-existences and successions (p. 49). As Dr. Weinberg observes, this should remind us of Hume.

We can agree that, if we are limited to pure logic and the immediate deliverances of "the external and internal senses" (p. 27) as Nicholas or Hume describe them, we can not derive more from such principles than they did. Nor can we demonstrate necessary connections between the known and the unknown. The nub of the matter lies in the question of principles taken broadly—what do we know prior to strict demonstration? Answers to this question are not demonstrable

("That nature exists," says Aristotle in *Physics* ii, "it would be useless to try to prove"), nor are they above dialectical examination.

By themselves, these objections to Dr. Weinberg's polemic give a false impression of his book. Nicholas' ideas are interesting, and there are no obvious reasons for doubting the substantial reliability of the exposition. Beside his negative dialectic on the limits of certainty, he constructed a "probable" account of the world, prudently and, perhaps, sincerely labelled as false when in conflict with sacred doctrine, which is worth studying.

Throughout Nicholas approaches problems from the standpoint of the knower and his certitudes, or "epistemologically," as many Augustinians had done, and as more philosophers would do later. Accordingly, "things" are primarily differentiated according to their "objective" being as objects of cognition, there being as many divisions as there are distinct kinds of cognition. Thus, a sensible whiteness is distinct from an intelligible whiteness; but the objects of precisely similar cognitions of whiteness are really identical and eternal, giving a multiplicity of essences at once unique and universal. As for "subjective" being apart from the knower, it is probable that the diverse objective beings are images of a unitary reality. All this, together with the "principles of the good" which are the foundations of probability, suggests a strong drink from neo-Platonic springs and explains many subsequent details as well as the reaction to Aristotle. For example, kinds of change are reducible to change of place, which in turn is not real change but the successive appearance of eternal essences at discrete points of space and time. Hence atomism is more probable than a belief in material substances having various potentialities for change; for becoming (as in Plato) is found to be self-contradictory. Such doctrines are of philosophic interest, because they are all of a piece with commitments about certain approaches to philosophic problems, though Dr. Weinberg does not develop these connections if he is aware of them. And they are historically important, because many of the reductions—of change to locomotion, of causes to occasions, of intuition to sense, of becoming to being, of being per se to being-as-known—were to become increasingly prominent in philosophy.

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The English Country Parson. By WILLIAM ADDISON. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1948. 246 pp. Illustrated. $3.75.

Did Mr. Ruskin know, an irate wife of a clergyman asked that English thinker, "what a country clergyman's life was, and that he was the poor man's only friend?" "Have they [the clergy of England], then, so betrayed their Master's charge," replied Ruskin, ". . . in their preaching to the rich; . . . that, after twelve hundred years entrusting of the gospel to them, there is no man in England . . . who will have mercy on the poor, but they . . . ?" This is the challenge the modern world lays before a long established institution. The clergy, as members of a serious and important profession, face a world where religion is waning into the fourth quarter of cant and indifference. The individual is turning to specialists in physics, medicine, and psychiatry for the answers. He tends to feel religion and its ministers outmoded.

In an age of materialism, when an increased awareness of social deficiencies has been remitted to a fight for material wealth as the supreme achievement of life, the average man has become bored with spiritual values and their professors. Yet spiritual values have a deep connection with a materially healthy society. Religion depends on the serious efforts of its ministers to make this connection apparent. It is, therefore, fortunate that Mr. William Addison has written a book on the history of the parson; and it is doubly fortunate that he has selected the country parson, for that is the man most intimately in contact with the life of the people. Indeed, what has he been doing these many years? Has Mr. Addison told the history of a vital functionary in our society, or merely given an account of a curiosity that should be, if he is not already, as obsolete as the dodo—flightless, in an age of air power?

A history of the English country parson should develop some sort of definition of the parson, it should attempt to show what he is as conceived by the history of what he has been, or the relation between his religion in the ideal, and his work as its fulfillment. The parson must translate his belief in God to an attack on today's problems of living. That is what Christ did. Although it may be worthwhile to contribute to the quantity of spirituality in the universe by praying behind a monastic wall, the English country parson has had to work directly with his parishioners. Addison notes that Christ was "a village

craftsman and not a high priest" and emphasizes that the ideal clergyman is found in the Hooker who had "a strong sense of this intimacy between the life of earth and the life of heaven."

Most important, says Addison, "the heart of our faith is not in a formula but a saviour." "Christ is the world's person," thus the parson should be a personality to combat the "distinctive evil of this modern system . . . its destruction of personality." With this idea in mind, Addison has painted his picture in the bright primary colors of personality, with few shadows of intellectual or theological adumbration. Wisely, therefore, this is a selective and not an exhaustive history. The attempt being made to catch personality, the parson's portrait is developed, not with infinite detail of chronology and names, but examples of character. The individual clergyman is not mentioned with less than that amount of illustrative incident necessary to realize his personality. Addison tends to be easy-going in his judgments in the light of human error. These are human beings, and human beings are never ideal. Their achievements are often colorful, but never perfect. So Addison seems to ask that we do not gasp with disillusion if a parson proves he is of the same mortal substance as ourselves by enjoying an occasional visit to the ale house.

The idea is, apparently, that a real personality cannot be grown in isolation, but only in the life of the community. "The good parson . . . had as much social as religious significance," he helped to "establish community life," and "set ideals of the gospel before [his] people." In the sixteenth century the church was the village hall, and much of the village communal life—such as banqueting, ale parties, village assemblies—took place in the nave. The parson was called to officiate at services which symbolized community fellowship and spirit. He had to work chiefly with laborers and peasants, people little likely to be interested in a deeply intellectual religion and needing a simple, practical, although sometimes symbolic, faith. There was Candlemas, which gave thanks for the gift of light, a Rogation Day that blessed the crops, and, in the spring, the plow was brought into the church and blessed. Many of these customs have survived, and have helped "every single cottager" to have "a sense of an ideal world strangely mingled with his own world of field and orchard."

In this manner Addison builds up the function of the country parson. There are great men in these pages, and perhaps more important

and valuable little men. On the latter is placed the responsibility for direct aid in the people's lives. They are sometimes successful, and sometimes failures. "Parsons are as mixed in kind as other men"—sometimes zestful, even profligate, other times shy and serious. There are lazy, absentee clergymen and others who have devoted their whole life, quietly sacrificing their own ambitions to their work. There is Hawker of Morwenstow, who smashed with an axe the pew of a doughty old parishioner; Parson Lynche, whose wife was a little too promiscuous even for 1563; Gilbert White, who, knowledgeable in "cottage economy," was able to give good advice in the management of eighteenth century homes; the gentle Hooker, shy even before his pupils; and Conrad Noel, who "hoisted the red flag, to the horror of Conservative landowners. . . ."

There are many others, and my only objection is that there are not even more. It must be admitted that Addison has wasted some space in covering a few commonly known men, most of whom are no more than the sons of parsons and whose lives are treated in any history of English literature. William Cowper, Joseph Addison, and Alfred Tennyson should not be used to displace biographical material of bona fide and obscure parsons.

Historical changes are sketched in briefly but significantly, and Addison winds up with a discussion of what is demanded of the parson of the future. Anti-clericalism, he decides, is the fault both of those parsons who made the profession one for their personal benefit, and the Puritan of the narrow-minded sort who expressed little of the mercy of Christianity and all of its harshness. The parson should be a personality, partake fully of the human spirit, be part of as well as ahead of real human life, which is varied and spontaneous.

The parson of the changing future, Addison suggests, must have, like Conrad Noel, "a vision of a new society in which the flagrant wrongs that disfigured the old order would be put right. . . ." The new parsons, as a result of lower standards of rectory life, are coming from lower social groups and preach "disturbing ideas of equality and the rights of the working man." The old parson had a custom, tradition, and solid quality deeply mixed with agrarian life. "Contact with life," therefore, which the old parson had and the charming but effete cultured parsons of the nineteenth century lost, the modern social parsons are regaining. So Mr. Addison's book is reassuring that the

country parson, with his homely virtues and active personality, is a valuable man in this age of an air power which is really no more than fancy tin.

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History of British Churches of Christ. By A. C. WATTERS. Indianapolis: Butler University School of Religion, 1948. 132 pp.

In the later eighteenth century, there appeared within British Protestantism a number of individual congregations giving their own local expression to the desire to restore primitive Christianity. Many of these single efforts died after a short life. Others eventually came into correspondence with each other and several movements, if not denominations, were consolidated. Some of the movements died out. One that remains is the British "Churches of Christ." About 1830 this group became acquainted with the work of Alexander Campbell in establishing the American Disciples of Christ. Ever since, there has been correspondence and co-operation, sometimes flourishing and sometimes languishing, between the two groups. By 1842, the British group had consolidated to the point of establishing a "Conference," some years ahead of the first "Convention" of the American Disciples. Today the two groups consider each other as fully brethen and are bound together in a World Convention of Disciples of Christ.

Until the appearance of Dr. Watters' book, there has been no history of the British Churches of Christ. Undoubtedly his work was accomplished in the nick of time, for it has been difficult enough for him to reconstruct the story of his brotherhood, especially the fast fading facts of its scattered and multiple beginnings.

In one sense, this book is addressed to the British Churches of Christ. Primarily it is their story, a rich garnering of names, committee appointments, dates of detailed decisions, etc. The body has never grown to more than 16,000 members, a numerical contrast to the half million British Baptists to whom they may be compared. Despite its small size the group has succeeded in establishing and maintaining both home and foreign missions, publishing enterprises, an educational institution, a social action committee, and undeniably has made a more definitive impression upon the theological conversations of the

ecumenical movement than have their American brethren, who number a million and a half.

Dr. Watters has done especially good work in relating the Churches of Christ in terms of direct historical relationship and thought patterns to the Secession and Relief Churches of Scotland, the Glasite-Sandemanians, the Scotch Baptists, Old Scots Independents, and the Haldane Movement, which form the ecclesiastical background out of which emerged the original unassociated churches of the present body. The charting of specific influences, such as the descent to the Churches of Christ of the Glasite "high doctrine of the ministry," of Covenant theology through the Secessions, and of tensions regarding communion from the Relief Churches, is full of discrimination, as is Dr. Watters' tracing of these influences to their present status. Unfortunately, extra-ecclesiastical influences are completely ignored. There is not a word about social and political factors, and only a weak attempt which does not mature to enlighten the movement in terms of philosophical backgrounds.

The group is distinguished by its practice of immersion of believers, and even more by its weekly practice of communion as the essence of Christian worship. Despite recent professionalizing of its preaching ministry, it retains a strong practical expression of the "mutual ministry," especially in service upon the communion table and in the "prayers of the church." Two questions have particularly vexed the life of the group: the terms of admission to communion, and the terms of association between the churches. The British churches have retained "close communion," and Dr. Watters reveals that suspicion of the American Disciples' "open communion" has been the major inhibition on the part of the British group to influences flowing from the American body. As the basis of association, the Churches of Christ have always demanded a detailed conformity of polity and practice among the churches. This despite the fact that, like the American Disciples, their terms of individual membership within the church are reduced to the simplest of confessions and the one institution of baptism, no respect being paid to creeds, and variety of personal belief being no handicap to fellowship. The contrast between liberality at the individual level and rigidity at the corporate level, a situation which makes them liberal in every area of doctrine except ecclesiology, seems never to have been felt as a tension within the British churches.

Even when the attitude resulted in schism, the remaining churches have persisted in their fundamental mentality and made changes only at the statutory level. This attitude has not only restricted the size of the body, but has molded its program of activity. In contrast to the American movement, within which a special cause may be organized by a minority, allowed to make demonstration of its worth, and eventually win approval by the Convention, such causes among the British are held back until there is at least a majority accord within the Conference—an accord which typically seems to have come a generation after similar work has been started in most other religious bodies.

The British group has been obviously pre-occupied with doctrinal concerns. In this regard they differ from the American group, whom they accuse of pragmatism. The difference can be seen even at the origins of the two groups. The American movement began as a plea for Christian Unity on the basis of the restoration of primitive Christianity. The British movement was originally a plea for the restoration of primitive Christianity, within which a plea for unity was implicit but emerged with force only after it was augmented during the visit of Alexander Campbell to Britain in 1842. The concern for primitive Christianity seems to have remained the more fundamental interest until well into the present century. It obviously lay at the more definitive depths of the British mentality when opportunities came for popular evangelism (on the American model) in the later nineteenth century. The British group seems to have been dominated by the presupposition that correctness of ecclesiastical polity in fine detail is so accessible on the pages of the New Testament that association of churches should be based on nothing else. They hold this attitude despite their fundamental catholicity, which, with its definition of the church in social terms, might have led them to a moral rather than a strictly doctrinal basis for their associated work.

In more recent years, the moral claims of unity have prevailed in the group and prepared it for thorough-going participation in the ecumenical movement. At the same time, their historic attachment to doctrinal interests gives them a peculiar advantage over their American fellows. They are thoroughly at home with traditional theological language. As Dr. Watters points out, Professor Will, of Strasbourg, has characterized the Disciples-Churches of Christ as a bridge church between Catholicism and Protestantism. The British Churches of Christ

are also one of the bridges over which European and American theologies may come into vivid acquaintance with each other.

Dr. Watters, on several pages, speaks as if the motivation to unity were the dominant original motive of the group. Evidence for this estimate is wanting in the face of the obvious fact that the motivation was to restore primitive Christianity, even if it could be done only in some utterly local way. The publication is occasionally marred by imprecise proof-reading, and in one instance grossly. The long paragraph at the bottom of page 57 and the succeeding short one, together with the quotations immediately above and below them should all appear as a single unbroken quotation from the *Christian Hymnary*.

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The Russian Idea. By Nicolas Berdyaev. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948. 255 pp. $2.75.

The eminent Russian philosopher died in March of this year as an exile in France, and this is one of his last books, written at the end of the war, published first in Russian, then in French. In the English translation there are already two editions, the first by Geoffrey Bles, which came out in London in 1947. The two English editions are completely identical, including misprints, but only the British one gives the name of the translator, R. M. French.

Although the author-philosopher declares on the very first page that he is not interested in "What Russia has been from the empirical point of view" but in "What the thought of the Creator was about Russia," the present book is essentially an historical one. This latter fact gives it its main value for a foreign reader. Berdyaev tries to find out "The Russian Idea," i.e., the essential religious and moral features of the nation, in the Russian religious, philosophical and political literature of the nineteenth century. This was the classical period of Russian literature and, from Berdyaev's point of view, it must reveal the hidden potentialities of the thousand years of history. However questionable this claim may sound, at least the last century of Russian religious thought is here made accessible, for the first time, to the English-speaking reader. Besides the universally popularized great

figures, he learns a great deal about many persons of whom the predicate of "second rate" would be unfair, but who, by the injustice of chance, have remained strangers to the West. Such are Bukharev, Fedorov, Leontyev, Rosanov, Florensky—some of whom have a touch a genius in them. Abundant quotations from their works allow a direct approach to their thought. The profiles are given in brilliant characterizations and, in the opinion of the reviewer, are mostly true to life. Yet, one is afraid lest, for most of the non-Russian readers, the new acquaintances will remain hardly more than new names, tantalizing by their strangeness but dimmed by the very method of the composition of the book.

Indeed, out of the ten chapters only two, the first, introductory, and the last, treating the beginning of the twentieth century, maintain chronological order. The remaining chapters divide the subjects into general categories of the Russian idea: philosophy of history, personality and world harmony, humanism and humaneness, socialism, appreciation of culture, the state and anarchism, religion, eschatology. The same names occur, as a rule, in every chapter, the whole individuality of an author being studied from different angles.

A far greater flaw in the book is found in the subjective principle of selection frankly confessed by the author. This selection reflects the interests and the world outlook of Berdyaev himself. Most of the writers treated are radicals, of revolutionary or reactionary mind. All moderate middle parties in theology or politics are eliminated. The "soil-rooted" school of literature, liberal nationalists, and even Pushkin, the greatest of the Russians, do not find a place in the "Russian Idea." It is true that the catastrophic end of the Russian Empire seems to have condemned the moderate, liberal evolutionists, but they existed, and they will exist when the Revolution belongs to the past. For millions of Russians they even represent the true expression of Russian Christianity and Russian national spirit. The same principle of selection is responsible for the choice of the dominant in the Russian Idea. For Berdyaev this is eschatologism, so characteristic of his own philosophy. No doubt, many of the authors of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century reveal an eschatological trend of mind: Dostoyevsky, N. Fedorov, V. Solovyev in his last years, Merezhkovsky, and others. This ideological trend coincides with the tragical collapse of the Empire and its civilization.

Besides, the Christian eschatologists stood outside of the prevailing secular currents of the Russian intelligentsia. What wonder if, in their minds, the revolutionary end of an epoch and a civilization was transformed into the vision of the end of all things? The eschatological line of thought has now been revived in Western Christianity as well. As to the Middle Ages, there is no noticeable difference between Russia and the West in eschatological expectations.

Nevertheless, the characteristics given by Berdyaev of the authors as well as of the individual national traits, are deep, penetrating, and mostly just. Of course, one will hardly share his optimistic or nationalistic generalizations, among which are the following: "The Russian people belong to the religious type" (p. 252), or that Russian ethical ideas are "more Christian" than those of Western peoples (p. 254), or even that the "way to the new Jerusalem is being prepared in Russia." The last affirmation, connecting the communist revolution with the Kingdom of God, reflects the recent nationalistic or Messianistic trend of Berdyaev's thought, so unexpected in and contradictory to the general spirit of his philosophy.

A sad duty of the reviewer is to acknowledge that the translation is very bad. It is too literal. There are many mistakes disfiguring the proper names. The unwarranted lack of an Index and even a Table of Contents creates additional difficulties for the readers of this brilliant and valuable book.

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Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXII. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America, 1948. 246 pp. $3.00.

For the greater part of the present century, Catholic philosophy in America subsisted under conditions of almost hermetic isolation from external philosophic contacts. The conditions under which philosophy was taught and studied during this period in Catholic colleges and universities throughout the United States were such as to make this isolation inevitable. Since philosophy was considered (as it still is) a compulsory subject in Catholic colleges, all the undergraduates took

the prescribed courses, none "majored" in philosophy, and few went on for graduate study in the field. Until quite recently, the preceptors of philosophy in Catholic institutions of higher learning were drawn almost exclusively from the ranks of the clergy. Most of these professors had little philosophic training outside their seminaries, many had no particular interest in or qualifications for the teaching of the subject. The curriculum followed the Wolffian division of metaphysics into general (ontology) and special (cosmology, rational psychology, natural theology). Metaphysics was prefaced by logic and epistemology, and accompanied by ethics. Texts used were specially compiled manuals in which "theses" were stated, terms explained, the theses "proved," and objections of "adversaries" dealt with. The limited philosophic material in these pedagogical treatises was presented in such a categorical manner that it was not easy for the reader to distinguish philosophy from apologetics. Most of the theses were stated to be "certain."

To the philosophy set forth in the manuals the term "Scholastic" was applied rather than "Thomist." Although in class the name of St. Thomas was frequently invoked, and occasional opposite quotations from his works adduced, professors did not ordinarily send undergraduates to the writings of the Angelic Doctor himself. One reason for this omission was that not every Catholic college library of the twenties or even the thirties possessed an English translation of the *Summa Theologiae*. As for modern philosophers ("modern" was taken to include the period from the Renaissance to the present), they were summarily despatched in the manuals by exposing their doctrines to particularly lethal syllogisms. For example:

> The opinion of Locke makes substance a collection of qualities or modifications which modify nothing;
> But a collection of qualities that modify nothing is false and contrary to fact;
> Therefore, the opinion of Locke is false and contrary to fact.[1]

It must not be supposed that the above interpretation of the function of philosophy has disappeared from contemporary Catholic institutions of higher learning. Indeed, many of the conditions enumerated survive in a large number of Catholic colleges today. But even before 1930, influences of some breadth were beginning to affect philosophy in Catholic schools. The impact of Neo-Thomism (itself only

1. Thomas J. McCluskey, *Notes on Ontology*. Ann Arbor, Michigan (1930), p. 78.

one important phase of the spiritual re-orientation toward Catholicism that occurred in France in the early part of the century) was perceptible more than twenty years ago in certain of the Catholic universities of the United States. Lay and religious professors of philosophy—many of them products of the Medieval Institute of the University of Toronto (until recently directed by the able Father Gerald Phelan)—had begun to filter into Catholic graduate schools, where they introduced to their students (most of them priests, brothers, and nuns) the actual texts of Thomas and other medieval philosophers, as well as the textual commentaries by the French Neo-Thomists and the scholars of Louvain. Dissertations on medieval philosophical texts increased in number in American Catholic universities, and increasing emphasis on the importance of the history of philosophy, formerly terra incognita in most Catholic colleges, was accompanied by sympathetic murmurs in favor of a re-approach to modern philosophers previously dismissed as "sophists" who taught only "error." The *Proceedings* of the American Catholic Philosophical Association began to include papers which took genuine, if cautious, account of contemporary non-Catholic philosophy.

The present volume of the *Proceedings* (compiled from addresses and papers read at the twenty-second annual meetings, December 1947) is not one of the strongest publications of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. It is interesting, however, as a document in which the old guard parochialism of American "Scholastic Philosophy" stands cheek by jowl with a certain awareness of world currents in contemporary thought. The theme of the present *Proceedings* is "The Absolute and the Relative." Some confusion as to what meaning would be assigned to these generic categories was, of course, inevitable. When Father S. E. Dollard, S.J. says, "I believe that a valid development of Thomism must, without surrendering its grasp of the Absolute, accentuate what we have called the Relative" (p. 37), and Father Charles Denecke, also of the Society of Jesus says, "Relativism is not a modern discovery, but the resurrection of an old and familiar heresy" (p. 40), it is obvious that they are not talking about the same thing. But the ambiguities inherent in the terms "Absolute" and "Relative" can be disengaged, at least partially, from other problems raised in the six principal essays of the *Proceedings*.

The presidential address on "The Natural Law," by Father Joaquin

Garcia, concerns a topic of considerable interest at a time when international tribunals have had to deal with the problem of formulating principles and basing decisions on some juridical denominator assumed to be common to civilized humanity. But Father Garcia's treatment does not rise to the majesty of his theme. He has hardly introduced his subject when he begins to worry about "atheists" whose presence at an international conference table, he feels, "greatly complicates matters." True enough, one whose world view is naturalistic would not feel himself bound by the Thomistic formulation of natural law as man's participation in the eternal law, which, in turn, is the exemplar-plan of the Divine Essence. But it does not seem to follow that a naturalistic philosopher would, therefore, a priori be barred from trying to formulate a "natural law" doctrine in naturalistic terms. It is conceivable, even likely, that a teaching of the natural law which assumed a non-theological ground of that law, would be quite as difficult to expound coherently as, say, one claiming to find a ground in nature for "human dignity." Is one, therefore, justified in dismissing the very possibility of a naturalistic view, backing up the dismissal with a citation from the Catholic Bishops of the United States? A gambit of this type is often cited by those who are sceptical of the very existence of an autonomous Catholic philosophy in America.

By his reference to natural law, in at least three different passages, as "Scholastic natural law," Father Garcia raises the question as to whether he interprets this law as one available to all men or just to Scholastics. Perhaps he means to say "the Scholastic teaching of the natural law." Doubts deepen when one is informed by Father Garcia that, if the natural law were to be observed by all, there would be no artificial birth control. Now, without allying oneself with those latter-day Malthusians who believe pan-contraception to be the one hope of humanity, one must point out that it is by no means self-evident that artificial birth control is contrary to the natural law. Even if such a proposition appears as the conclusion of a long deductive chain, certain premises of the polysyllogism will bear careful inspection. What detracts from the persuasiveness of Father Garcia's exposition is the implicit assumption that, if we grant the existence of the natural law, we must also be prepared to accept a series of official and specific deductions from it that touch on questions which many honest men feel they are not quite ready to have settled for them.

The annual Association Address by Father Paul Reinert, "A New Opportunity for Catholic Philosophy," puts forth a qualified approval of the "Great Books" program of Mortimer Adler. It contains nothing whatsoever of philosophical or religious interest. Father Dollard's paper, "A General Survey of the Problem of the Absolute and Relative," pretends to be little more than a genial introduction to the problem, with appropriate references to the history of philosophy. Father Dollard expresses his conviction that many Thomists have become "too Absolutist," and recommends attention to the existential element he feels is implicit in Thomism. The phrasing of his recommendations shows that the tendency to ipse dixit formulation does not die easily. "Gilson has shown," says Father Dollard, "that the emphasis or stress is to be put on existence, not on essence."[2]

Father Denecke's essay, "The Absolute and the Relative in the Metaphysical Order," is a competent piece of Scholastic dialectic. Starting with an analysis of the epistemological situation, which is represented as beginning with spontaneous affirmation of *being* beyond the self, his argument leads to a stage where the data of experience (of which *being* is now realized to be validly predicated, though relatively) are seen as participating in being which does not depend on anything prior to itself, i.e., God, the Absolute in the metaphysical order. One can understand that limitations of space prevented Father Denecke's expansion of his admirable dialectic at all points where fuller development would have been instructive. Scholia dealing with questions such as the following would have been welcome: what does it mean to say that the intellect in assenting affirms *being*? One can grant that the perceiver admits the existence of something other than himself, but it is not clear how we can—and Father Denecke is convinced we do—disengage *being* from its "concrete determinants" and yet have something more than an abstract category. Further, there is more than one mention of the "conformity of the intellect with the object known." What is the nature of this conformity? Is it absolute? Surely Father

2. Father Dollard suggests that, since God is not *Ipsa Essentia* but *Ipsum Esse*, the Thomist *Ens* is not to be taken in the sense of something fixed or static. Assuming that his implicit argument is: if God is Being (*Ens*) and Pure Act, then Being cannot be static, one would have enjoyed further development of this interesting argument, together with an analysis of the meaning of Act as a surrogate for *Ens* in connection with his statement, "I do not deny the Immutability of God."

Denecke would say that only God can really know all there is to be known about the object. A relative conformity, then! Granting that the perceiver need not *distort* the object, does he not simplify it? And if so, is not this conformity only approximate, i.e., relative? Again, Father Denecke says that the epistemological assent "transcends not only this particular experience to which it has an immediate reference, but all experience." One wonders how one could transcend all experience? Perhaps the subject's actual experience is meant, not all possible experience.

The paper on "Absolute and Relative in the Moral Order," by Father F. X. Meehan, is a moderately clear statement of the traditional Scholastic "first principles" in morals. Moral good is regarded as a phase of ontological good, and, therefore, ethics is viewed as inextricable from metaphysics. Good per se is taken as that in virtue of which a nature attains its end *(bonum conveniens)*. The good for man is taken as the attainment of all that man can be, a perfection which God has prefixed for him. This good for man can be known by reason. God's law "imposed from without" becomes immanent in nature through the natural law, which all men can know. But even one not too hypersensitive to "absolutist" presentations in moral philosophy must admit a degree of baldness in certain aspects of Father Meehan's commentary. His insistence that God "must oblige men to conform to His Will," and his labeling objectors to an ethics of imposed law as "incorrigibly rebellious," arouse no more sympathy for his position than the attempt in his peroration to draw support from the theological opinions of Clare Boothe Luce. Such tactics provide easy aid and comfort for secular relativistic moralists.

The only major contribution to the *Proceedings* which shows any inclination to rapprochement with modern and contemporary philosophy is Dr. James Collins' essay, "The Absolute and the Relative in Modern Philosophy." Dr. Collins' paper is the most lively of the six principal essays, and the only one which indicates a mind at some ease in extra-Scholastic areas of philosophy. While admitting the value of emphasizing the "radically existentialist" character of Thomistic metaphysics—an ingredient which Dr. Collins assumes is really present in Thomas—he warns that the discovery of this existential side of Thomas' philosophy is no ground for complacency on the part of contemporary Thomists. Dr. Collins feels that a re-examination of certain medieval

metaphysical categories abstracted from their Ptolomaic contexts would be profitable. He is also aware of a need to establish contact between Thomist and contemporary philosophies, and to that end he stresses the desirability of providing proper facilities in Catholic colleges and universities for the study of modern philosophy and its historical background. Concerning what passes for scholarship in many Catholic institutions, Dr. Collins is eloquent:

> Shoddy dissertations and articles are often approved and even published on the mistaken notion that a third-rate job here is better than none at all—especially if it renders an emphatic verdict in favor of Thomism. But mediocrity and doubtful integrity have never won out in the long run in philosophy, no matter what the cause they pretend to serve. The actual consequences of inferior scholarship and intelligence in dealing with modern problems is to produce the conviction that Thomistic philosophy has nothing to offer the modern mind.

It is a matter for wonder that no paper in *Proceedings* presents the problem of the absolute and the relative in terms of the infinite-finite dualism which has been the framework assumed in the construction of so many of the philosophic systems of the Western traditions, and which must be the metaphysical undergirding of any synthesis between Catholic faith and philosophy, whether its articulation be in Thomist or Augustinian terms. The simplest Catholic faith begins with this dualism, the most majestic *Summa* cannot but reaffirm it. A contemporary dialectical reformulation of this ancient polarity, freed of parochialism and special pleading, would do much to remind a secular culture of the dignity and breadth implicit in the Catholic tradition.

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Christian Apologetics. By Alan Richardson. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1947. 256 pp. $3.00.

In one of the most significant theological books to appear in many years, Canon Alan Richardson, of Durham Cathedral, has produced a work of paramount importance in the realm of Christian theology, particularly as it evaluates its own message in relation to the rest of the world. In a few succinct sentences, he deftly cuts through the confusion which exists so often between "apologies" and "apologetics." He states,

"Apology in its Christian meaning implies the defence of Christian truth. . . . Apologetics, as distinct from apology, is the study of the ways and means of defending Christian truth" (p. 19). By thus defining his field, the author also shows why Christian apologetics is "primarily a study undertaken by Christians for Christians," although it may have the secondary value of answering questions for honest, non-Christian enquirers.

On the basis of this concise and clear-cut definition of apologetics, Canon Richardson shows what he believes its function for our times to be, namely, the demonstration of an appropriate "scientific methodology" which "as applied to the facts of Christian existence today—to the facts of the existence of the Church and her Bible—yields a body of knowledge which requires and validates, at the scientific level, certain strictly theological categories, such as that of revelation" (pp. 16 f.). The basic aim of the book is to show that there is a valid scientific methodology for theology which can demonstrate and authenticate certain categories exclusively theological in nature, principally the category of revelation. This is done by a highly competent and often brilliant treatment of the relation of faith and reason as they relate to the primary theological category, revelation.

> Theology as a science stands or falls with the category of revelation; if there is no distinctively Christian revelation in history, the special categories of theology will not be needed, and in the place of theology the scientific study of religion could be more competently undertaken by the psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists (p. 57).

To establish the validity of revelation as the category of theology, the author demonstrates that the "sciences" are not limited to natural sciences, but include all disciplines which pursue the "study of observable facts and their systematic classification by means of the making and testing of hypotheses in the light of all the available evidence" (p. 40). There is, among the various sciences, the common element of the "scientific method," but the independence of each science rests on the use of "independent categories" which are not reducible to those of any other. Thus, an "independent science" is a science which has its own proper categories. Theology is such an "independent science," says the author, because it has its own proper category of revelation.

Canon Richardson is avowedly Augustinian. There are chapters on General Revelation and Special Revelation in which the rationalist

distinction between natural and revealed knowledge is refuted, and the necessity of special revelation for the proper understanding of general revelation is argued. Knowledge, in point of fact, is dependent on revelation, and the proper understanding of this knowledge depends on special revelation. The author incisively demonstrates the validity of revelation by showing that reason standing by itself is doomed to failure. It must always have faith as its necessary *prius*. This "faith-principle" (the term appears frequently throughout the book) is operative not only in realms of religious knowledge but in all knowledge, including the realm of the physical sciences. It is faith that permits reason to work; it is the "key category of epistemology and the very condition of the knowledge of the truth . . ." (p. 78). Faith and reason are not opposed to each other, nor are they merely supplementary. Faith is the necessary condition for the proper functioning of reason. "Faith supplies the 'clues' or categories of interpretation by which alone the empirical *data* of science and religion can be understood" (p. 230). The assertion is made and argued throughout the book that a Christian *philosophy* to be a *Christian* philosophy must confess that reason can work only on the basis of faith, that there must be an illumination of reason by divine revelation.

Revelation is thus shown to be the category which determines the independence of theology as an "empirical science," and, by validating this category, the claim of theology to be an "empirical science" competent to carry on the work of formulating its doctrines according to this scientific methodology is established. As a science, however, theology needs data. This, the author finds in the *corporate* existence and experience of the Church. The data of theology as an empirical science, therefore, are not the individual's experiences, but rather the total life and experience of the Church in its continued, historical existence. "The task of theology . . . arises because of the existence of the worshipping and witnessing Christian community [which includes the Bible], and theology is the science which seeks to formulate categories by which the phenomena of Church-existence may be understood." (p. 51). Thus, Canon Richardson scores that kind of theology which makes the religious experience of the individual the datum of theological science. The only proper datum for Christian theology is the "worshipping and witnessing Christian community." It is only in this way that an independent theological category can be found. This is

particularly so, since there is an inherent and necessary relationship between that which is the theological category (revelation) and the existence of the Church. The Church is based on revelation, but it is only within the Church that revelation can be fully received. Following this line of thought, we can never fall into the fallacy of confusing theology with the philosophy of religion, or the psychology of religion, or the sociology of religion.

The primary concern of this book is epistemological. By dealing with the epistemological problem, the attempt is made to establish the validity of revelation as an independent category, thereby giving theology the status of an independent, empirical science. Undoubtedly, this is the important task for our day, as the author himself explicitly states in the Preface (which the reviewer feels to be a most important part of this book). Yet, one cannot help wondering to what extent epistemology can be separated from metaphysics. The process of revelation must bring the revelation of something. A discussion of revelation as a way of knowing must embody a discussion of what is known. The two are inseparable.

While we feel that a treatment of the metaphysical basis for Christian apologetics would have made the book more complete, it must be borne in mind that Canon Richardson worked under the self-imposed restriction of treating the category of revelation as the process by which we know *(revelatio)*. And, in a time when philosophy itself is concerned with the problem of knowledge, as is the case today, Christian apologetics itself must also deal with this problem. There is, however, a certain fallacy in thinking that this aspect of the problem constitutes the whole. There is a need to be aware of this and to remember that the metaphysical aspects of the total apologetic effort must be taken into account. This is not intended to be an unappreciative comment on Canon Richardson's book, for it has done for our day and age that which needed doing—and it has done it brilliantly. Yet, in looking toward the day when the metaphysical aspect may predominate over the epistemological as far as the attention of philosophers and theologians is concerned, we feel that Christian apologetics will have to take this problem into consideration and thereby re-address itself to the situation at that time. The task of Christian apologetics is never finished, and Christian theology is deeply indebted to Canon Richardson for his brilliant exposition and analysis in dealing with one of the

fundamental aspects of Christian apologetics and, thus, providing a sound basis for Christian apologies.

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The General Theological Seminary

Church, Law and Society. By GUSTAF AULÉN. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948, xvi, 114 pp. $2.00.

Bishop Aulén is an unusual person in his combination of scholarship, musical ability, alert Churchmanship, and genuine humanity. Some of his books are now being translated, and we shall thus soon see more of his scholarship. His production in Swedish is extensive, and always creatively suggestive and historically informed. He is (or was) the President of the Swedish Royal Academy of Music, has both written and composed hymns, and has also carried other important responsibilities along musical lines. As a church leader he has exercised much influence for many years. But above all, he is a warm, natural, humble, human being, who may unconsciously pattern his life after his great hero, Archbishop Söderblom. His full life makes him a vital thinker, not only in a historic-systematic way, but in an intensely practical sense.

We were fortunate, therefore, in having Bishop Aulén in this country before he became too old. Surely the Hewett Lectures show no signs of a declining mental or spiritual vigor! This lectureship is ample enough to call world leaders to Union Theological Seminary, the Episcopal Theological School in Cambridge, and the Andover Newton Theological School. The depth and subtlety of the Aulén lectures, however, could hardly have been caught by many listeners, so that even those who heard him should now read them with great care. For here we have presented a vigorous development of Lutheran social ethics by one of its strong representatives. A larger and very rich treatment of the Lutheran approach to social ethics is now also available to many in Eivind Berggrav' *Staten og mennesket,* a work which begs to be translated into English. *Church, Law and Society* is, in fact, dedicated to Bishop Berggrav. If only now Nygren, too, would present us with his social ethics! As it is, we see a strong development of this field by first-line Lutheran leaders. This volume should definitely be read with this in mind.

The main gist of the lectures is easy to state, but the careful differentiation of perspectives is too subtle and complex to convey in a book review. The Church is responsible for society. It relates itself responsibly to society by means of "the Law of God." This law is not natural in the historic sense of *lex naturae,* nor in the sense of orders of creation, nor in terms of rationalism, nor yet in terms of modern man's concern with the dignity of man. The Law of God, rather, is a universal *dynamis,* a creative force for justice, present everywhere in history, but understood clearly only by the Church from the Word of God. The Law of God is the Gospel of God's intended right relations for individuals and for society as a whole. This law applies everywhere except in the locus of salvation. There the law becomes an enemy and a hindrance. For the law cannot save at all. It simply is no way to salvation. But it is demanded in all human relationships outside and inside salvation. The Law of God is *Agape* concretely at work according to circumstance. "The first use" of the law, that of prescribing and regulating right relations, Aulén contends, has too often been neglected by Lutheran theology, for the sake of "the second use," namely to convince men of sin and their need of salvation by faith and grace alone.

The right perspective on the law and the right use of it in Christian theology has been lost by two opposite heresies: pietism and modernism. The former retreated into quietism, leaving the world without guidance or help from the Church; the second reduced the holy law of God, which towers above every circumstance and every human attitude, to a practical historic relationship that could be achieved by men. Often it became even a matter of evolution or natural progress. The former withdrew from the world; the latter secularized the Gospel. The former made the Gospel irrelevant to social and political issues; the latter, by emasculating it, made it impotent.

This is a day that peculiarly craves a re-thinking of the whole issue of the relation of the Church to society in terms of law. Bishop Aulén draws heavily on the experience of the Norwegian Church, which found that resistance to earthly authority became a duty in terms of sheer justice. Exactly the Gospel concern for all conditions of men made such opposition to oppression necessary, regardless of who were the particular victims. Since we may have to meet the same issue even more crucially tomorrow, Bishop Aulén calls for a self-examination of the Church, especially in the light of its new and vigorous theology

which has discovered its biblical and Reformation roots, and its own distinct meaning as a Church proclamation.

For its fine distinctions and theological insights, the book itself must be read. Its strong points are many. I mention merely its significance for Lutheranism and the ecumenical movement precisely at this time. It also throws much light on Lundensian theology, with its central stress on *Agape*. We have here no quietism, nor yet mere social gospelism; we have here no static natural law, nor yet a dismissal of the problem of justice in secular history; we have here no denial of the primacy of love, nor yet an attempt to reduce all else to its direct sphere; we have here no separation of love as attitude and justice as concrete action, yet neither are they the same without allowance for functional difference according to relative conditions of application.

The questionable points concern such problems as whether the law is abolished in the perspective of justification, or whether it is not rather fulfilled. God does not forgive contrary to the highest law, but makes us able to fulfill a new law. We have a new righteousness "in Christ." What is actually abolished is the primacy of the juridical perspective, and what is restored is the personal perspective. The personal relation to God thereby becomes primary and empowers the forgiven believer to live within a new perspective and power. The new dynamic law of personal relations, of fellowship, takes the place of the juridical law of perfect rules over against the person. In this sense, the law as "an enemy" is slain. But such "abolishing" of the law is simply the removal of the false perspective under which the sinner or doubter works, and by means of which he wants to justify himself, to be good enough in himself, and to refuse to accept the fellowship for which he was made. "Where there is no law there is no trespass" then means that, where the juridical perspective is pushed into its rightful place, namely a decidedly secondary position, there is no longer any attempt to live by the external law, but rather to live within a new understanding and freeing fellowship, the fellowship of God's love, wherein right relations are effected and established.

The second question is whether salvation can be narrowly defined as merely a matter within the perspective of justification. Salvation should involve the total man in all his relations and throughout his whole pilgrimage to God. If that is so, the law becomes a condition in salvation, the sign of the reality of the fruits, as Aulén admits in connec-

tion with obedience (p. 71). But it also becomes an instrument not only to convict of sin, but also to make clear the real road of right relations which men must learn with one another and with God. And these right relations are not merely in the personal perspective between the individual and God but also between society and God. As such they are actually part of *the process* of salvation. In that case there cannot be a sharp contrast, and certainly not a total difference of perspective, between *locus civilis* and *locus iustificationis*. This subsumptive relation, of course, in no way denies the primacy of the classical perspectives, but refutes all overly neat solutions based on them.

The third real problem concerns the concrete application of the Law of God. That it be not static, but dynamic, is good. The State, for instance, may have had a place in God's dynamic law yesterday, for instance, but may have none tomorrow. We need a definite revelation and an existential application. But our days are too critical for us not to be as specific as we can. Could not Bishop Aulén have indicated to us how he would have applied these truths concretely, right now, to the problems of war, the Church and the State, and the whole question of international relations? But perhaps that is an existential responsibility which cannot be assumed, even illustratively, by the theologian, but only by those who have to make the actual decisions. Perhaps we are expecting a dynamic treatment to be made capable of direct rational relevance. Yet that is exactly the problem that is acutely upon us all.

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The Shaking of the Foundations. By PAUL TILLICH. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. 3, 186 pp. $2.50.

The Protestant Era. By PAUL TILLICH. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. xxix, 323 pp. $4.00.

It is no exaggeration to say that, for many of us, Paul Tillich has come to be the modern thinker who best expresses both the situation in which the world finds itself and also the Christian attitude and answer to our dilemma. His occasional essays and articles, his books which have already been translated into English *(The Religious Situation* and *The Interpretation of History),* and above all the man himself

(both in conference and conversation, as in formal lectures), have had an enormous influence on the American religious mind; while, for those of us who have been fortunate enough to read him in his own tongue (a tongue which he now confesses is hardly as much his own as English, after his years of residence in this country), his profundity and his wisdom, as well as his vast learning, have excited our admiration and reverence. For this reason, we welcome the two volumes which have just appeared in English—one a volume of sermons, for the most part preached in the Chapel at Union Theological Seminary, where for some time Dr. Tillich has been Professor of Philosophical Theology, and the other a collection of essays which includes material from some of his earlier German works, as well as quite recent American writing. For those who have not yet made the acquaintance of Tillich and his thought, the two books provide an admirable introduction and will prepare for the great work of systematic theology upon which he is now engaged, which should appear within a reasonably short time. This is particularly the case because the second of the books, *The Protestant Era,* has a useful and, on the whole, quite adequate sketch of Tillich's position vis-à-vis our contemporary cultural problem, by Professor James Luther Adams, of Meadville Seminary, who "suggested the organization of the book and the selection of its parts," as Dr. Tillich tells us in his introduction; while it has also a semi-autobiographical sketch by the author himself, in which he gives a "retrospective and somewhat personal record of the development which is reflected in the different articles and which has led to the point of view from which the book is conceived."

In *The Shaking of the Foundations,* Dr. Tillich has attempted to state the fundamentals of his position in "a language which expresses in other terms the human experience to which the Biblical and ecclesiastical terminology point." He believes this attempt to be demanded by our times, since, in our situation today, the conventional language of the Church and Bible has "no meaning" for vast numbers of people who, at the same time, are desperately in need of precisely the gospel which Christianity proclaims. Therefore, on the basis of texts from the Scriptures, the many-sided position of the Christian tradition is affirmed, with a remarkable freedom from homiletic cant or pulpit rhetoric, with a singular grasp of the exact problems of contemporary men and women, and with a deep and thought-provoking

restatement of the perennial truths which the Church holds as its eternal treasure.

Such themes as the temporal limitations of man, his inherent sinfulness, his pretension and pride, alongside the gospel of God's eternity, his deliverance of man from frustration, his empowering of man by "the new being in Christ," are set forth with clarity and often with beauty of phrasing. Those who are familiar with Tillich's thought will recognize the several emphases, but they will be delighted to see that it is possible to state them simply yet without loss of profundity. Decidedly this is a book for the preacher today, as well as for the intelligent layman.

The larger work is, of course, particularly significant for the thinker and the scholar, although it is not too difficult for anyone who will work at the job of reading. The book *is* hard to read, but the reason for this is that Dr. Tillich is opening up new ground, seeking to get at our cultural situation and the relevance of Christianity to it in a new way. The theme which runs through the book is the insistence upon man in relation to the "Unconditioned," a relation which need not be expressed in specifically religious terms because it is a perennial fact, inescapable and inevitable. Alongside this theme runs the second, that while it is possible (indeed probable) that Protestantism in its denominational form is in danger of disintegration, the "Protestant principle" is eternal in Christianity, for it is that corrective against pretension which can save, and alone can save, established and traditional religion from becoming "demonic" in making claims to be absolute, a claim which can only belong to the "Unconditioned"—that is to say, to God himself. Still another theme is the importance and necessity of the symbolic or sacramental in Christianity, with the recognition that it is by this that Christianity is related to the "vital realities" which are "inherent in genuine symbols, words, acts, persons, things." For want of this recognition, Tillich declares, Protestantism has sometimes appeared to reduce Christianity to "rational concepts, moral laws, and subjective emotions."

Dr. Tillich believes that the "moralistic character" which has marked much of Protestantism has so "overburdened the personal centre" that man has become unable to stand the strain; community, the depths of experience below conscious and rational thought, the expressive and impressive power in symbolic actions and objects, are

stressed as the safeguards which will have to be rediscovered if Protestant Christianity is to meet the human situation. Theology, too, must be re-oriented, if it is to do its job; but let it be noted that Dr. Tillich is not one of those who believe that this is to be accomplished by any "reduction" of the "absurdity" and the "paradox" of the Christian gospel. On the contrary, it is to be accomplished by the painful rethinking of the whole rich content of that gospel, but with due attention to the new conditions, the psychological-sociological pattern of modern man, and the need for penetrating below "moral man" to "existential man."

There are two points in particular to which the reviewer would call attention. One is Tillich's continued insistence on the superficiality of much of the "personalism of modern theology. He demands a deeper grasp of man in relationship to God and his fellows, which shall take account of the vast areas of unconscious or impersonal, at any rate of *felt,* relations which we sustain with others. The second is his recognition of what the reviewer has, in other connections, ventured to call "the schizophrenic situation of modern man," even of Christian man. The split in personality, by virtue of which we are today torn in allegiance, in belonging, in emotional and volitional assent, in thinking—and which our Christian profession from one point of view only emphasizes and increases, because it affirms the terrible chasm in our culture—is faithfully and continually maintained.

There are, of course, some points where one might venture to disagree with Dr. Tillich—his implied Christology, for example, which, to the reviewer, seems to have what is technically called a monophysite strain. But these are relatively minor points in a great work. In fact, one should close by saying that no single book in recent years seems so much *required reading,* and is so likely to be influential in changing the thinking of both Protestant and Catholic theologians in the *right* direction, as *The Protestant Era*—and the reviewer is all the happier to say this, because he is himself an Anglican Catholic who owes more than he can ever hope to repay to the kindness as well as to the wisdom of Paul Tillich.

W. Norman Pittenger

The General Theological Seminary

BOOK NOTES

The Heathens: Primitive Man and His Religions. By WILLIAM HOWELLS. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1948. 306 pp. $3.75.

Primitive religion has been a favorite subject of anthropological investigation. Usually it is the ethnologist who exposes its frequently bizarre features, at times even to the exclusion of other and equally basic aspects of primitive life. *The Heathens,* however, is the work of a physical anthropologist, best known in non-anthropological circles for his informative and witty book, *Mankind So Far.* The present volume is equally salty and engaging.

Dr. Howells belongs to that group of anthropologists who, for more than half a century, have been emphasizing the fundamental psychological similarities between human groups, despite noteworthy differences in geographical environment, social structure, knowledge, and achievement. Like his more "advanced" brother, primitive man uses what knowledge he has to assuage his individual fears and bolster his body politic, but less familiar with scientific fact, he relies in much greater part on religious beliefs and magic. Thus, by subscribing to the established tabus, he feels himself "in tune with the universe" and not too threatened by the ills he may fall heir to. At the same time, tabus act as a "ritual confirmation of a tribe's community strength."

These two themes dominate Dr. Howells' discussion of magic, medicine, witchcraft, ghosts, souls, death and ancestor worship, totemism and gods. Under such rubrics he scrupulously utilizes well-recognized monographic sources and assembles data from many regions. Advanced students may wish that Dr. Howells had explored more fully the psychological and sociological reasons for the likenesses and the differences he finds in religious expression, but they, as well as less specialized readers, will be stimulated by the entertaining style and the often provocative formulations.

ESTHER S. GOLDFRANK

Ramakrishna: Prophet of New India. Abridged from *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna,* translated [from Bengali], with an Introduction by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA, Foreword by ALDOUS HUXLEY. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948. 304 pp. $3.50.

Swami Nikhilananda, in his preface (p. ix), gives the reasons for this abridgment of *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna* (New York, 1942):

> First, the regular edition contains many references to Hindu mythology and folklore with which the general Western reader is unfamiliar, as well as discussions of certain recondite aspects of Hinduism. These features create unnecessary difficulties. Second, the regular edition, being a complete translation of all the authentically recorded conversations of Sri Ramakrishna, contains repetitions which are largely responsible for its one thousand and sixty-three pages. It is not convenient to carry such a book around or to use it for daily devotional study. The abridged version removes the difficulties, yet without in any way minimizing the importance of the

regular edition. On the contrary, it is hoped that the present volume may stimulate the reader's desire to read all the recorded words of Sri Ramakrishna.

The publication by a trade publisher would seem to indicate that the briefer version is, indeed, better fitted for the larger public than the privately printed original. The reduction has been accomplished with remarkable skill, and yet one cannot but wonder here and there if the knife may not have cut too close. The first part of the book runs along in excellent style, but about half way through it becomes apparent that, though the Master's doctrine is being well presented, his personality and the rich texture of the life around him are not, and that, as a consequence, the conversations are losing color and becoming monotonous; for the playfulness and quick virtuosity of Sri Ramakrishna's always amazing spirit appeared in precisely those twists and turns that the sensible abridgement has taken away. When one considers, however, that 759 pages were removed from an original of 1063, the wonder is that so much remains. We can still experience the force of a doctrine so filled with the blissful knowledge of God that the normal difficulties, queries, judgments, and ideals of virtuous, thoughtful men lose weight before it. The universally tolerant and compassionate view of a mind suffused with transcendent understanding dissolves the barriers of creed, caste, race, and culture-style. A divine joy pervades the dialogues, and throughout resound echoes of those other devotional idyls of the Buddha and his monks, Krishna and his Gopis, Chaitanya and his devotees, and Jesus and his company.

Since the publication of *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna,* India has become interesting to the newspaper reader. Perhaps the present volume will catch his eye. For others, however, the unabridged version is to be recommended. When read, not at one sitting, but piecemeal, and turning here and there, the briefer book retains its freshness, sometimes bringing conversations into a new light.

Finally, of course, one must be glad to see the words of Sri Ramakrishna in any format, going forth into the Christian World.

JOSEPH CAMPBELL

La Connaissance du Bien et du Mal et le Péché du Paradis. Contribution à l'interprétation de Gen. II-III. By J. COPPENS. (*Analecta Lovaniensia Biblica et Orientalia,* Ser. II, fasc. 3) Louvain: É. Nauwelaerts, 1948. 153 pp. Fr. belges 70.

In 1946, in the *Mededelingen* of the Flemish Academy, Professor Coppens published a study, "De Kennis van Goed en Kwaad in het Paradijsverhall. Een nieuwe proeve van verklaring," which attempted a new solution of the problem of what is meant by "knowledge of good and evil" in the biblical story of the Fall. At the gathering of the Society for Old Testament Study at Cardiff, in September, 1946, he presented a resumé of his theory, which had such a favorable reception that he was encouraged to present his views in a

form in which they might reach a wider audience than that rather small group familiar with the journal of the Flemish Academy.

The volume as it now appears is in three parts. First, the author's statement of the problem, his criticism of previous suggestions for its solution, and his own solution now proposed. This is followed by an elaborate series of Notes on the material in the first part, giving the necessary bibliographical indications, and developing further certain points in the discussion. Thirdly, in a series of Appendices, he gathers a great deal of supporting material which it would have been difficult to integrate into the simpler statement of his thesis. These Appendices are, perhaps, the most valuable part of the volume.

For careful statement and clarity of exposition this is a model essay. One may not always agree with the author's conclusions, but there is never any uncertainty as to what the points he desires to make are, or of the grounds on which he bases his conclusions. The problems with which he is concerned immediately are two: first, what is the meaning of the phrase "to know good and evil" in the story of the Fall?; second, what exactly was the transgression the writer of the story thought that Adam and Eve had committed? Questions as to the mingling of sources in the account of the Fall, of the real significance of the serpent, and whether there were two trees or only one tree in the garden, are subsidiary to these. To the first problem his answer is that it can only mean that totality of knowledge, containing both good and evil, in which their sin consisted. To the second, he answers that it was concerned with sex, and consisted in the attempt to withdraw that relationship from the control and benediction of Yahweh and place it under the sanctions of the local fertility cult deities.

In Appendix I, he gives an elaborate documentary analysis of the chapters Gen. 2-3 to suggest a solution of the vexing question of "doublets" in the story. In the second, he surveys the literature referring to the problem which had appeared since the publication of his study in the *Mededelingen,* and, in the light of this develops further the arguments in favor of his own position. The third surveys the various theories which had already proposed some form of sexual interpretation of the Fall story. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth, he brings together a unique assemblage of material concerning the serpent and its association with various deities in the religions of the ancient Near East. The seventh takes up the interpretation of Gen. 3: 22, "behold man is become as one of us, to know good and evil," which is an obvious stumbling-block to the sexual interpretation, and which he would now translate, "behold Adam, and whoever shall be born of him, shall have to come to know good and evil." The study closes with a very useful "documentation" of the pictorial representations of serpents in connection with deities, and with elaborate indices to the whole study.

Such a study is obviously going to meet with a varied reception. The reviewer's own reaction is that there is too much insistence on fine points of distinction. In an ancient writer setting down religious stories in which there

had already run together, long before his time, streams of tradition of most varied origin, can we expect such subtleties as these theories suggest? No reader, however, can fail to profit from the author's lucid and well documented discussions of the various points he raises, and the collection of material in his Appendices is of permanent value.

A. J.

The Goodly Fellowship of the Prophets. By JOHN PATERSON. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948. xi, 313 pp. $3.00.

In this volume the professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis at Drew Theological Seminary presents a study of the Hebrew prophets based upon lectures to theological students, ministerial conferences, and adult education groups. All the prophetic books of the Old Testament are treated in chronological order, with the final chapter entitled, "Christ: The Goal of Prophecy." The general method followed for each prophet is to set him in his historical background, then relate what can be known of his own life, and, finally, discuss his significance in the history and religion of Israel.

This book is clearly and attractively written. The author draws extensively upon his knowledge of English literature and many other extra-biblical sources to illumine the message of the prophets. He has a wide acquaintance with the critical literature on the prophets, but does not place critical questions in the forefront. He has a deep appreciation of the importance of the Hebrew prophets, and the result is a book which can be warmly recommended to students and to the general reader.

On critical problems, the positions adopted by Paterson are usually conservative or moderate. For Hosea, he follows the view that Gomer was chaste at the time of her marriage to the prophet, becoming unfaithful after marriage; the first and third chapters recount the same story. The Messianic passages of Isaiah are accepted as genuine. Most of the Book of Micah is considered genuine. Habakkuk is dated about 600 B.C. Jeremiah is interpreted as having supported the Deuteronomic reforms at first, later becoming disillusioned about them. Most of the Book of Ezekiel is accepted as the work of the prophet. Zechariah 9-14 is dated, with Stade, in the earlier years of the Greek period. Paterson does not offer new critical theories on the prophetic books, and is content in general to "sweep into the background the mere 'sawdust of criticism,' " as is appropriate in a work of this nature.

This reviewer's adverse criticisms arise partly from the naming of the book, and partly from a certain lack of proportion in the treatment of the several prophets. The title "goodly fellowship," time-honored as it may be, is not really appropriate to the Hebrew prophets. The great prophets were too much men of splendid isolation, hurling God's judgments upon a sinful nation, to fit into such a title. No modern man would have enjoyed their fellowship!

There seems a lack of proportion in the space assigned to the various prophets. For example, seventeen pages are devoted to Nahum in a vain

attempt to make him a real prophet; then, twenty pages are given to Jeremiah, and only fourteen to Deutero-Isaiah, who represents, in many ways, the climax of Hebrew prophecy!

The volume is well printed, with a selected bibliography at the end. In a note on page 181, a book of Stanley Cook's is attributed to G. A. Cooke.

J. Philip Hyatt

4000 Years of Christmas. By Earl W. Count. New York: Henry Schuman, 1948. 95 pp. $2.50.

Henry Schuman has launched his series of small books on the great religious festivals with this altogether delightful volume. Written by a professor of anthropology with a missionary background, the book combines high scholarship in the best objective tradition with a warm, subjective feeling approach which should endear it to every Christian. The book is also beautifully designed and printed.

Professor Count takes us all the way back to ancient Mesopotamia to find the origins of some of the motifs of Christmas, especially in the New Year festival celebrating the annual renewing of the world by Marduk. He traces this festival of the renewal of life on its migrations northward, via the Danube in the east, as well as from Rome in the west, until it reached the dark forests of northern Europe. At last, after a long struggle, the rougher elements of this Saturnalian festival were softened into the Christian folk customs of modern Europe.

In a very interesting chapter, "A Mother and Child in Quest of a Birthday." Professor Counts discusses the Church's choice of December 25th in relation to the theme of renewal as it appears in the solar cult of Mithra as the birthday of Sol Invictus, the commencement of the solar year. This chapter would have been greatly enriched by a reference to Isis, Queen of Heaven, and her divine child, Horus, the infant sun, born in a humble hut at the darkest hour before the dawn, for the Isis cult played an important role in the development of the cult of the Blessed Virgin.

The author is especially felicitous in his treatment of the more homely, folk aspects of the Christmas customs of Europe—the use of the evergreens, the candles, the Yule log, the bells, and the tree, all of them having their roots in the rich soil of paganism. Perhaps the Christianizing of these primordial symbols of life and its eternal recurrence should be regarded as one of the major achievements of the Church, for modern psychology teaches us that symbols are immortal—they can never be destroyed, but they *can* be transformed and regenerated—and *must* be, if civilization is to survive. We know only too well the destructive power of an unregenerate symbol on the loose—witness the Nazi swastika.

As a final word, we should like to recommend this charming book to good St. Nicholas as the "book of the month" for Christmas stockings.

M. B.

The Biography of a Mind: Bosworth of Oberlin. By Ernest Pye. Oberlin, Ohio: Bosworth Memorial Biography (c/o Otis C. McKee), 1948. 2 vols. 812 pp. $8.00.

A work of this kind constitutes the noblest type of monument, and one which every true teacher would prefer to a pillar of marble or a statue of bronze. The first volume consists of elucidation and comment; the second comprises the addresses of Bosworth himself. Dr. Pye's painstaking exposition and examination of Bosworth's thought, at once deeply appreciative yet independent and critical, is a distinctive product of the liberal spirit. And it is precisely this characteristic which will attract the attention of the worker in the philosophy of religion who stands outside the circle of Bosworth's pupils, and his pupils' pupils; for the re-appraisal of liberalism is a task which presses upon us with increasing urgency.

Thirty years ago it seemed to most of us that liberalism was destined to advance from victory to victory until it had dominated practically the entire field of theology and the philosophy of religion which lies outside the "iron curtain" imposed by the Roman Catholic Church. Yet these high expectations were doomed to disillusionment. The expansion of liberalism has been checked by defection from within and invasion from without. Orthodoxy, "neo-orthodoxy," and pseudo-orthodoxy have joined hands with naturalistic "humanism" to arrest its progress. Despite their mutual opposition, these two movements are alike characterized by a dogmatic obscurantism which would restrict the exercise of reason in the sphere of religion; the former by invoking a supra-rational revelation too sacrosanct to be subjected to criticism; the latter by imposing an "empirical" epistemology which views sense-experience as the only source of knowledge. Unless a breakdown of civilization interrupt the development of human thought, it seems clear that further progress will leave behind these two movements, each so one-sided and intolerant, and carry us forward to something genuinely new. Inevitably, therefore, the question arises whether a reviving liberalism will point the way along which we are to advance. And this, in turn, involves a further question—whether the eclipse of liberalism has been due purely to external causes, such, for instance, as the pessimism engendered by two terrific wars, or is, in part, the consequence of some defect in liberalism itself. Hence, this able presentation of the viewpoint of so typical a representative of this school as Bosworth provides a timely opportunity for intelligent scrutiny.

Concerning the genesis of humanism, Dr. Pye has some instructive observations to make. What is of greater significance, however, is the positive content of Bosworth's thought. Its outstanding characteristics may fairly be enumerated as follows: (1) an experimental acquaintance with mysticism, (2) a deep-rooted conviction of the metaphysical importance of personality, (3) a broadly empirical outlook, tinged with pragmatism, and (4) a limited agnosticism (cf. I, 253-54). Do these constitute the essential features of an adequate *weltanschauung?* To this reviewer it appears obvious (and he believes that

Dr. Pye is of the same opinion) that there is a relative superficiality about such an attitude, that what is most needed is a coming to grips with such fundamental problems as the nature of time, its relation to eternity, the reality of universals, the status of values, the realm of a priori knowledge, the question of origins, and the concepts of substance, event, creation, evolution, and salvation, if we are ever to secure a satisfactory basis for subsequent construction. Only then can we attempt to evaluate the significance of personality and the claims of mysticism.

Does this mean that there is nothing positive in Bosworth's work that is of value? On the contrary, there is much, and that most worthy of emphasis at this present time. The genial tolerance, the emphasis upon the authority of reason, the truly catholic breadth of view, which are the peculiar glory of liberalism, are as fundamental in Bosworth's thinking as they are deplorably absent in neo-orthodoxy and naturalistic humanism. The reader will find much that is suggestive and thought-provoking, not only in Bosworth's own addresses (e. g., in his treatment of prayer), but especially in Dr. Pye's discussions of such topics as the respective standpoints and ideals of the various religions, mysticism or revelation; and I feel sure that he will echo the hope of this reviewer that Dr. Pye will next proceed to give us his own philosophy of religion.

ROBERT LEET PATTERSON

Religion in the Twentieth Century. Edited by VERGILIUS FERM. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1948. xix, 470 pp. $5.00.

One welcomes eagerly a book on so interesting a subject as the historical traditions and present state of the chief forms of twentieth century religion. Twenty-eight different forms of living religion are briefly set forth by recognized authorities, most of them representatives of the faiths they describe. As the chapters are arranged, the oldest living faiths are treated first, and then the survey is brought down to the most recent expressions of religion.

The several faiths are described with varying completeness. Perhaps the more recent expressions of religion fare better than the more ancient in the degree of adequate coverage. If one were to cavil, he could point out that Hinduism is described in 13½ pages, Taoism in 9½, and Confucianism in 14, while Christian Science is allowed 20½, the Ramakrishna Movement 17½, and the Mormon Church 16½. But there is much to praise. Some of the chapters are marked by high excellence: for example, those on Confucianism (by Chan Wing-tsit), the Eastern Orthodox Church (by George P. Fedotov), and the Society of Friends (by Howard H. Brinton).

These chapters manage to cover much ground with clarity and a fine sense of historical proportion; they contain a great deal of pertinent matter not readily obtainable in so succinct a form. Able, brief statements describe Jainism, Buddhism, and the several forms of Judaism, although, especially in

the case of Buddhism, much has been omitted of necessity. Special excellencies may be mentioned. One would have to look far for stronger, more firmly stated descriptions of such positions as Roman Catholicism, Anglo-Catholicism, and Ethical Culture. The chapter on Zoroastrianism presents some challenging facts from a study of language-forms which may compel a revision of the traditional dates for the life and work of Zoroaster. An acute analysis of the way of "self-naughting" which leads to Nirvana adds much to the chapter on Buddhism (by the late A. K. Coomaraswamy). The chapters on Taoism and Shinto are especially valuable for the up-to-the-minute material on present day aspects of these faiths.

But there are weaknesses. The treatment of Liberal Protestantism, aside from its careless writing, is misnamed; by the author's own definitions, it is plain that he has written of radical Modernism rather than of the median position of most liberal Protestantism. Some chapters are badly arranged, and others contain gaping hiatuses. A further weakness is the arrangement of the book itself. The average reader will have difficulty grasping the chronological scheme. It would have been better to follow the usual and more logical order of other books on the world's religions, and to have first arranged the chapters according to "families of religions," and then let chronology have its way within these major groupings. As the order now stands, one leaps from continent to continent, back and forth across the world. A true "horizontal" cross-section would not naturally have this order. The editor has actually reverted to the "vertical" principle he repudiates in his preface.

The reviewer feels some misgivings about the editor's use of these last quoted terms. It may be granted that the cross-sectional or "horizontal" view of living religion leads to a more immediate sense of kinship among religions than a historical-minded "vertical" view. But is this more than a first impression? Is not the deeper study of religion in history productive of a deeper sense of unity? An examination of the editor's application of the terms vertical and horizontal to the perspectives of the priest and prophet respectively raises a further question. Is not the prophet one who "looks around" (horizontally) only to be impelled, as a result, to look both back and ahead? The prophet is not only realistic in the sense of seeing contemporary life steadily and whole, but imaginative in the moral sense in being able to see causal sequences stretching back into past time and forward into the future.

But, defects aside, this is a valuable and informative book. It is successful in one very important respect: it conveys the sense that each form of religion in the world means a great deal to its adherents, and much also to those who have to come to know it intimately. Whether it is equally successful in suggesting the "basis for the kind of unity in religious tradition in the one world that by necessity is now to be fashioned" (a major aim of the book) is doubtful.

John B. Noss

Person och gemenskap. By Rudolph Johanneson. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1947. 255 pp. Kr. 9.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading. "The Individual and Society," or "Person and Fellowship," would lead us to expect a psychological or sociological study. The real subject is indicated in the first sentence, "the problem of human existence is in the last analysis a religious question." Since religion implies a relationship of man to what he considers to be the highest and most decisive element in the universe, his individual and social status is determined within the sphere of religion. The purpose of the book is, therefore, to clarify how man's relationship to the highest good is conceived of in Roman Catholicism and in Lutheran theology, and how this affects the idea of fellowship.

The author devotes an introductory chapter to the ideas of Plato and Aristotle on this subject. He begins with a quotation from Aristotle: "Every act and every inquiry, and similarly every action or pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good is rightly declared to be that at which all things aim." The author translates ἀγαθόν by "value" or "valuable," and consequently characterizes the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle as a philosophy of value.

Plato and Aristotle agree that value determines all human actions, but they differ in their interpretation of the concept. For Plato, the highest good transcends the subject; for Aristotle, it is immanent in the subject. In Plato, the idea of the good is an objective reality which demands man's devotion; in Aristotle, it is man himself who desires to preserve and perfect his own being. Plato is more of an individualist, while, for Aristotle, "the goals which are realized in the state are of the highest value for man."

The Roman Catholic conception is represented by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The fundamental question for Augustine is man's desire for happiness, *felicitas*. The object of man's desire is transcendent, and man can be satisfied only in an unselfish devotion to God (p. 55). The right love, *caritas*, has its object in God, and all created things are simply means for attaining this. But, in *cupiditas* man desires to use God in order to enjoy the world. *Caritas* is thus similar to Plato's emphasis, but Augustine also holds that, in this devotion to God, man seeks and finds the completion of his own being. Since God is also the common good, *bonum commune*, the man who loves God must also love his neighbor. Thomas has developed this conception further, but on lines already laid down by Augustine. The tension between transcendence and immanence is found in both, but the fundamental Aristotelian conception of the development and preservation of self always has the upper hand.

In contrast to this philosophy of value, the Lutheran conception lies on an entirely different plane. Here we find a contrast between value and the Word. God is not the God of highest value, but the God of the Word. Man comes into a right relationship to God, not by making him the object of his striv-

ing, but by receiving the Word. The Word and faith go together, just as value and works. In this Word God confronts man, and man stands before God either in faith or unbelief. Man's relationship to God is always governed by the Word, i.e., law and gospel. God as Creator governs his world through law which is universally valid. The author fails, however, to indicate what specific meaning the Church as the new fellowship has in this connection. On the whole, his treatment of the Roman Catholic position is clearer than his exposition of the Lutheran.

ERIC H. WAHLSTROM

The Kingship of Christ. An Interpretation of Recent European Theology. By W. A. VISSER 'T HOOFT. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948. 158 pp. $2.00.

This little book consists of the Stone Lectures for 1947, delivered at Princeton Theological Seminary. It is an illuminating commentary on recent theology in Europe. It shows that the European Protestants, in their devastating experiences under Nazism, have rediscovered "Christ the King." The Kingship of Christ has meant to them primarily two things: First, the necessity of obeying Christ rather than Hitler or some other tyrant; second, the conviction that, since Christ is now king over the whole world, the terrors and miseries of life today must inspire courage and hope rather than despair. One cannot but respect the loyalty of the European Protestants to Christ and their sufferings in behalf of their King.

On the other hand, Dr. Visser 't Hooft's book raises theological questions which must not be ignored if the churches are to live by truth and a stable faith. A comparison of chapter three, "The Kingship of Christ in the Bible," with chapters four and five, dealing with the kingship of Christ in the church and in the world, makes it plain that European theologians are engaged in reinterpreting the Christian faith according to their situation and need, rather than in terms of rigorous biblical exegesis. They are moderns who cannot take "the mythology" of the New Testament seriously. Their thought is "existential" and practical. "The Kingship of Christ" is too much a weapon against defeat and despair, and too little a faith in Christ the living and life-giving Spirit, whose resurrection was a fatal blow at Satan and whose Return will be the culmination of His victories over the Evil One. The question is: How far can demythologized Christianity remain true to the biblical faith?

One of the major themes of this book is that Christ is now king over the whole world, and not only over the Church, as orthodoxy has maintained. Of course, this is a very encouraging doctrine, but in what sense is it true? "The world" does not acknowledge Him as King. Besides, it is hard to think that the evils in our world happen according to Christ's will.

"Christ rules through his word. . . . His victories are spiritual victories. The Church has no right to claim any other power or to use any other

means of persuasion than those which its Lord has used. . . . The Church knows that the sword of the Spirit is in the long run more powerful than any other sword" (p. 131).

Christ, therefore, rules the world through the prophetic word addressed by the church to the world as state, economic order, etc. The Europeans have discovered "the Social Gospel," even though Dr. Visser 't Hooft still misinterprets and rejects the American brand as "moral advice" (p. 127). However, the Kingship of Christ as interpreted above is different from the warfare of "the horseman on the white horse" in the Apocalypse (p. 87). It takes more credulity than faith to believe that Christ will destroy Satan by fighting with the present words spoken by the churches.

This is a very suggestive book. It raises numerous exegetical, theological, practical questions, the chief among which is whether European theology is not becoming a Christolatry. We must watch the Protestants in Europe with eagerness and hope. We must benefit from their insights arrived at through much travail. But in our more leisurely position, we must try to do justice to the fulness of the Christian faith in God, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

God's Boycott of Sin: A Consideration of Hell and Pacifism. By RACHEL H. KING. New York: Fellowship Publications. 1947. 122 pp. $2.00 (Cloth), $1.25 (Paper).

The rather curious title of this book reflects an equally curious content. The author, as she states in the Preface, started to write a book about the doctrine of hell. Somewhere between the first draft and the last, she became a pacifist and decided to write about that too.

It seems that modern Christianity started slipping when it dropped the doctrine of hell, "a keystone of the theological structure," and began to get soft. Occasionally Dr. King expresses an insight with a recognizable resemblance to contemporary theologies. For example, hell is a word "that fully expresses the Christian's confidence that God will say an ultimate and absolute and unqualified 'no' to sin" (p. 44). The definition of hell is "alienation from God" (p. 51). Many contemporaries are rediscovering the significance of apocalyptic symbolism to point to a meaning of moral decision and the destiny of life beyond literal historical categories. But this book shares none of their reticence about making literal statements about the future, none of their insistence that "now we see through a glass darkly." The author is sure that while we experience hell in this life, the pain will be much more intense after death. We are expected to balance nicely the cost of serving God now against the greater cost in the next life of failing to serve Him (pp. 105-6).

The ethical theory is just as unsubtle. From a starting point of ultimate allegiance to God, the author reaches an absolute legalistic ethic, according

to which sin involves anything from studying in bed after "lights out" to fighting wars. Loyalty to God, rather than practical consequences, is the basis for decision, and we can be sure at every moment of God's requirement upon us, both as to end and means. There is nowhere an indication that loyalty to God might lead men to try to achieve justice in the world by choosing a positive course of action from the imperfect alternatives offered by a confused historical situation. The only suggestion of such a conception is refuted with the contention that there must be a perfectly sinless course of action in any situation—otherwise Jesus could not have been sinless. The legalistic conception of sin is also involved in the one point where the author admits a place for ethical relativism. The goal of life is complete love of God. Since this is more than we are capable of as a starting point, we can begin by complete obedience (spurred on by fear of hell) and gradually get trained into love (pp. 119-20). Thus it seems that through a gradual process we may get scared into loving God.

The title of the book comes from the idea that God's action toward sin is "nonviolent non-cooperation"; God "boycotts" sin and thus leaves it miserable. But because of "non-moral matter" in the world, the boycott is "diluted" and is never complete until the life to come (pp. 48-49).

Nels Ferré has written a cautious Introduction, in which he refrains from endorsing the conclusions but hopes that the book may stimulate thought with its originality.

ROGER L. SHINN

What Is a Man? A Design for Living That Makes Sense. By ROBERT RUSSELL WICKS. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. xxi, 224 pp. $2.75.

The author of this meaty little book believes that a fruitful way of getting at his complex and elusive subject is to analyze some of the suggestions about it contained in one of the great expressions of the human spirit, The Lord's Prayer. Accordingly, he is primarily concerned with man in his relations to God and other men, and with the subtle mechanisms employed by the human ego in its devious attempts at self-justification. The six themes which he finds suggested in his guide are "our awareness of mystery," "our two futures," "our final dependence," "our entanglement in necessities," "our habit of self-defeat," and "our continuous conversion." Themes so broad leave room for a discussion of many matters, ranging from personal mental hygiene to international affairs and the relations of church and state.

The result of the analysis is not a pedantic tome of theology or psychology, but rather a series of impressions and convictions gleaned from a fruitful lifetime of working with people, mostly young people of college age. For a number of years Dean of The Chapel at Princeton, the author explores in this book some of the perennial questions about the proper study of mankind which several college generations have raised with him. His reflections are expressed in a clear and simple style, embellished frequently with witty,

homely, and pertinent illustrations from his own experience, and his language is that of the university platform and discussion group.

Throughout one catches something of the spirit of a man who seems to be wise, tolerant, realistic, and deeply committed to a religious tradition whose profoundest insights, he believes, are to be rediscovered and reinterpreted in contemporary psychology and social science. Dean Wicks combines the courageous spirit of the unrepentant liberal with the sobering insights of the new orthodoxy in a point of view which is neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but sane and inspiring. His conclusion is that "ours is a serious predicament—imperfect people all tangled in the consequences of unlimited relations in an inexhaustible universe, dealing with titanic forces of cosmic machinery and responsible to universal laws, so few of which we know. This state of things is not our choice, nor entirely our fault, but our permanent condition" (p. 182). He believes that nothing less than the Christian faith, intelligently understood and courageously practiced, is adequate for such a predicament.

J. A. Martin, Jr.

Problems in Religion and Life: A Manual for Pastors. By Anton T. Boisen. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1946. 159 pp. $1.50.

The work of Dr. Boisen stands as clearly pioneer work in the psychology of religion. The sympathetic grasp of the materials and the probing insights into them which characterize his earlier *Exploration of the Inner World* mark a necessary step forward on the path first taken by William James, and beyond the place where Starbuck and Pratt and later writers stopped. With enormous personal and intellectual courage, Dr. Boisen went beyond them in refusing to leave unexamined the conventional distinction between the "normal" and the "pathological." He found religious experience not only in the nice and normal ways of life. He found depths of religious stirrings among the most catastrophic and subverting emotions of human personality, as they are to be seen in schizophrenic experience. Today the theological movements that make men, with Barth, look to something beyond easy rationalities and make them receptive of the thought of Kierkegaard, have awakened students of the psychology of religion to the necessity of such inquiries. And both world events and daily reports of progress in the depth psychologies give Dr. Boisen's contention increasing importance.

Back of his theoretical formulations and their implications as he has worked them out, there stands a method of study and research. Equal in importance to his bold examination of mental disorders on the thesis that they shed much light on conversion experience, is his continuing insistence that, for the understanding of human nature, one must turn to the primary sources, not books but the "living human documents." The method of examining living experience and of entering into the fastnesses of the private world where a man faces ultimate issues has given body to Dr. Boisen's work.

This careful, painstaking inquiry into the live issues of individuals and communities is, he holds, the backbone of the pastoral method. This concern made Dr. Boisen one of the founders and most active members of the Council for Clinical Training, established to give first-hand practical training under supervision to theological students in institutions where they would meet human beings in need. This same concern has shaped his teaching at the Chicago Theological Seminary, and has suggested and formed this present manual for pastors.

The empirical approach, co-operative research, field-work, conceptual interpretation: these are the foundation stones of the method. All this is to the good. The empirical method, however, carries clear overtones of "empirical theology" which seems to look for its justification in some sort of pragmatism. That John Dewey is named as "our greatest philosopher" is one indication of the author's viewpoint, but a more important indication is his understanding of the role of the minister. He is simply described as "among the servants of mankind." Dr. Boisen prefers to think of him, not so much as "traditionally the representative of God" but as one "whose effectiveness is based upon his character and whose authority depends on his mastery of certain fields of human experience and on his insight into the problems of human living." He never raises the question what the tradition means, or how contemporary method and knowledge fit into it. Rather, there is, in this liberal theology, simply the substitution of the modern for the traditional. Thus the outlook of the book is limited to the minister's own practical service, *his* character, *his* insight. This is a far cry from all classical Christian understandings of the ministry as also speaking the Word of God.

While the discussion does not get beyond these limitations, within them it is admirable and—what Dr. Boisen would want it to be—practical.

THOMAS J. BIGHAM, JR.

Essays in Jewish Biography. By ALEXANDER MARX. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1948. xii, 298 pp. $3.00.

Alexander Marx, whose services to Jewish scholarship in historical and bibliographical fields have been outstanding in our generation, has collected in this volume twelve biographical accounts of his fellows and peers among Jewish scholars. The first four sketches deal with intellectual leaders of medieval Jewry; of these the second, on "Rabbenu Gershom, Light of the Exile," has never before been published; those on Saadia Gaon, Rashi, and Maimonides have been included in other publications. The remaining eight sketches testify to Marx's sympathetic ability to enter into and appreciate the contributions of both his teachers and his contemporaries and co-workers. Of this group, the hitherto unpublished, extended treatments of Moritz Steinschneider and David Hoffman have particular value. The others are briefer, though no less interesting.

J. L. B.

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